cil report,"Visa Backlog Costs U.S. Exporters More Than $30 Billion Since 2002, New Study Finds," June 2, 2004
(online at www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1686&Category=All).
port issuance standards are among the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists, possibly including two of the 9/11
hijackers. Three models exist for strengthened prescreening: (1) better screening by airlines, such as the use of
improved document authentication technology; (2) posting of border agents or inspectors in foreign airports to
work cooperatively with foreign counterparts; and (3) establishing a full preinspection regime, such as now exists
for travel to the United States from Canada and Ireland. All three models should be pursued, in addition to elec-
tronic prescreening .
the spelling of their names to defeat name-based watchlist systems and confuse any potential efforts to locate them.
While the gradual introduction of biometric identifiers will help, that process will take years, and a name match
will always be useful.The ICAO should discuss the adoption of a standard requiring a digital code for all names
that need to be translated into the Roman alphabet, ensuring one common spelling for all countries.
and Carl Levin on April 13, 2004.The letter did not mention any element of the Department of Defense. It stated
that the DCI would define what analytical resources he would transfer from the CTC to TTIC no later than June
1, 2004. DCI Tenet subsequently told us that he decided that TTIC would have primary responsibility for terrorism
analysis but that the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency would grow their own analysts.TTIC will have task-
ing authority over terrorism analysts in other intelligence agencies, although there will need to be a board to super-
vise deconfliction. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004).We have not received any details regarding this plan.
conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each of TTIC's partner elements, as well as other Federal depart-
ments and agencies as appropriate." Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin, Apr. 13, 2004.
4. In this conception, the NCTC should plan actions, assigning responsibilities for operational direction and
as TTIC is now.Whichever route is chosen, the scarce analytical resources now dispersed among TTIC, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Joint Interagency Task Force--Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT), and the DCI's Countert-
errorist Center (CTC) should be concentrated more effectively than they are now.
mission. It would yield much of the broader, strategic analytic duties and personnel to the NCTC.The CTC
would rely on the restructured CIA (discussed in section 13.2) to organize, train, and equip its personnel.
ing the JTTF structure now in place.The Counterterrorism Division would rely on the FBI's Office of Intel-
ligence to train and equip its personnel, helping to process and report the information gathered in the field.
bled in the Defense Intelligence Agency's JITF-CT should merge into the planned NCTC.
ments that utilize Homeland Security's analysis of domestic vulnerabilities and integrate all-source analysis
of foreign intelligence about the terrorist enemy.