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Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there
is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incom-
plete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief
of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a
call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice Pres-
ident entered the conference room.
216
At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from
the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft--presumably hijacked--heading
toward Washington.That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was get-
ting this information directly from the FAA.The FAA may have been track-
ing the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to
Washington, not its actual radar return.Thus, the Secret Service was relying on
projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.
217
At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice Pres-
ident and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was
asked for authority to engage the aircraft.
218
His reaction was described by
Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to
decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the
inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversa-
tion with the President.The military aide returned a few minutes later, proba-
bly between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again
asked for authorization to engage.The Vice President again said yes.
219
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff
Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet
moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and
confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the Presi-
dent was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had
not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President.
220
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-
minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the
President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at
10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft
if necessary.
221
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania.
Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to
this authorization.
222
At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another
hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a
minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to
"engage or "take out" the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat confer-
ence call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an
inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out.The Vice President's guidance was we
need to take them out."
223
Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the
"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"
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