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14. For the August report, see Intelligence report, "Terrorism: Alleged Threat by Arab Terrorists to Attack the
World Trade Center in New York," Aug. 12, 1998. An FAA civil aviation security official believed the plan was
improbable because Libyan planes were required to operate within airspace limitations and the Libyans did not pos-
sess aircraft with the necessary range to make good on the threat. Jack S. interview (June 13, 2004). On September
30, 1999, the FAA closed the file on the August report after investigation could not corroborate the report, and the
source's credibility was deemed suspect. FAA report, Transportation Security Intelligence ICF Report 980162,
undated; but see FAA/TSA rebuttal to the Joint Inquiry's Sept. 18, 2002, staff statement, undated, p. 1 (stating that
the FAA did not formally analyze this threat).The Algerian hijackers had placed explosives in key areas of the cabin.
However, there was some speculation in the media based on reports from a passenger aboard the plane that the
hijackers had discussed crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. FAA report, FAA Intelligence Case File 94-305, undated.
15. For Murad's idea, see chapter 5, note 33.
16. For Clarke's involvement in the 1996 Olympics, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). For the
1998 exercise, see Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004); NSC briefing paper, Nov. 10, 1998.
17. For the report of the National Transportation Safety Board, see NTSB report, "Aircraft Accident Brief,"
Mar. 13, 2002 (online at www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm). For the early 2000 CSG discussion, see NSC
note, CSG SVTS agenda, Jan. 31, 2000.
18. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
19. FAA memo, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence,"Usama Bin Ladin/World Islamic Front Hijack-
ing Threat," Intelligence Note 99-06, Aug. 4, 1999, pp. 5­6.
20. Ibid.
21. As part of his 34-page analysis, the attorney explained why he thought that a fueled Boeing 747, used as a
weapon, "must be considered capable of destroying virtually any building located anywhere in the world." DOJ
memo, Robert D. to Cathleen C.,"Aerial Intercepts and Shoot-downs: Ambiguities of Law and Practical Consid-
erations," Mar. 30, 2000, p. 10. Also, in February 1974, a man named Samuel Byck attempted to commandeer a
plane at Baltimore Washington International Airport with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into Washing-
ton and crash into the White House to kill the president.The man was shot by police and then killed himself on
the aircraft while it was still on the ground at the airport.
22. For NORAD's hypothesis of aircraft as weapons, see, e.g., Ralph Eberhardt interview (Mar. 1, 2004). For
the 2001 Positive Force 01 exercise, see DOD briefing (Apr. 29, 2004); Tom Cecil and Mark Postgate interview
(June 7, 2004).
23. For the Gates report's recommendations, see DCI task force report,"Improving Intelligence Warning," May
29, 1992. For strengthening of the warning official, see DCI memo,"Warning," July 17, 1992. For the recommen-
dations languishing, see Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For CTC having responsibility for warning, see
Robert Vickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003). For the Board's warnings, see, e.g., Community Counterterrorism Board
report,"Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks," June
30, 2000.
24. CIA briefing materials,"DCI Update," Aug. 23, 2001.
25. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). For more on this meeting, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
26. For the briefing to the President-elect, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).The CIA's formal analysis
of what would happen if Bin Ladin alone was removed as compared with the importance of shutting down the
sanctuary was offered in several places. See, e.g., CIA analytic report,"Likely Impact of Taliban Actions Against Al
Qaeda," Feb. 21, 2001 (provided as background for Tenet meetings with Rice on Feb. 23 and Mar. 7, 2001).
27. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
28. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003) (reading from CIA email, Mike to Winston Wiley, Aug. 27, 1997).
29. For President Bush's statement of al Qaeda's responsibility for the Cole attack, see White House transcript,
"Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Sept. 20, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
30. For Pavitt's view, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
31. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). Zinni was concerned about excessive collateral damage caused by
Tomahawk strikes. See Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
32. For Shelton's view, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Cohen's view, see William Cohen inter-
view (Feb. 5, 2004).
33. Russell Honore interview (Oct. 29, 2003).
34. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
35. Ibid.
36. Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003).
37. Rich interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
38. CIA memo,Tenet to Gordon and others,"Usama Bin Ladin," Dec. 4, 1998, p. 2.
39. See, e.g., Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); Jeff B. interview (Dec. 11, 2003); Louis Andre interview
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