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out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker.The Vice President
entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.
209
Once inside,Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the
tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President
asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected.
He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw televi-
sion coverage of smoke coming from the building.
210
The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney's arrival at the White House at 9:52,
and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous
notes, at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President advis-
ing that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe
this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not to
return to Washington. After the call ended, Mrs. Cheney and the Vice Presi-
dent moved from the tunnel to the shelter conference room.
211
United 93 and the Shootdown Order
On the morning of 9/11, the President and Vice President stayed in contact
not by an open line of communication but through a series of calls.The Pres-
ident told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning.
He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of
time.The line to the White House shelter conference room--and the Vice Pres-
ident--kept cutting off.
212
The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just after
entering the shelter conference room. There is conflicting evidence about
when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room.We have con-
cluded, from the available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the room
shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.The Vice President recalled being told, just
after his arrival, that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol
over Washington.
213
The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of
engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish
the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized
to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that
concept. The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it
reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot.The President empha-
sized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft.
214
The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President
spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not
hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice Presi-
dent and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,"Sir,
the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she
recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." She believed this conversation occurred a
few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room.
215
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15.
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