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6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the subsequent exchange, see NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD inter-
view 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
180. For the ESU team's perspective, see NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU
(Feb. 19, 2004). For a firefighter stating he would not take instructions from the NYPD, see FDNY interview 38,
Battalion 4 (Feb. 11, 2004). For a firefighter alleging that ESU officers passed him without sharing evacuation
instruction, see FDNY interview 57, SOC (Apr. 15, 2004). A member of the only ESU team that this firefighter
could have encountered above the 11th floor states that his team did share its evacuation instruction with firefight-
ers it encountered. NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004).
181. NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004).
182. NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview
18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
183. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004);
NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004).
184. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May
4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command
(Nov. 20, 2003).
185. For officers being in the concourse, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1, Special Operations Division, and
Divisions 1, 2, and 3 radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001. For the survivors' actions, see NYPD memo, requests for depart-
mental recognition 3, 4, 5 and 6, June 26, 2002; NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD inter-
view 2,Transit (Jan. 2, 2004).
186. For the collapse's effect, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For officers not
receiving the evacuation order, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003); PAPD interview 5, Lin-
coln Tunnel Command (Nov. 24, 2003). For officers deciding to evacuate, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge
Command (Sept. 25, 2003); PAPD statement 5, Lincoln Tunnel Command (Dec. 10, 2001). For officers slowing
their descent, see PAPD interview 10, GW Bridge Command (Sept. 25, 2003).
187. For the North Tower collapsing at 10:28:25, see NIST report,"Progress Report on the Federal Building
and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC," June 18, 2004, appendix H, p. 40. For those in stairwell B who survived
the North Tower's collapse, see FDNY report, Division 3 report on operations on Sept. 11, 2001, undated; Dennis
Cauchon and Martha Moore,"Miracles Emerge from Debris," USA Today, Sept. 6, 2002, p. A1.
188. According to the number of death certificates issued by the New York City Medical Examiner's Office,
the WTC attacks killed 2,749 nonterrorists, including nonterrorist occupants of the hijacked aircraft. New York
City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner report,"WTC Victim List," undated (as of July 9, 2004).The Pentagon
attack killed 184 nonterrorists, including the occupants of the hijacked aircraft. FBI report, list of Pentagon victims,
undated (as of July 9, 2004). Forty nonterrorists died in the crash of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. FBI
report, list of Flight 93 victims, undated (as of July 9, 2004). Our conclusion that these first responder death totals
were the largest in U.S. history is based on our inability to find contrary evidence. For FDNY fatalities, see FDNY
report, September 11 tribute, undated (online at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/media/tribute/tribute.html). For
PAPD fatalities, see PAPD report, "In Memoriam," undated (online at www.panynj.gov/AboutthePortAuthority
/PortAuthorityPolice/InMemoriam/). For NYPD fatalities, see NYPD report,"NYPD Memorial: 2001 Heroes,"
undated (online at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial_01.html).
189. Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004); OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004); Richard Sheirer inter-
view (Apr. 7, 2004);Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004); Bernard Kerik interview (Apr. 6, 2004).
190.The Incident Command System (ICS) is a formalized management structure for command, control, and
coordination during an emergency response. ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies
as they work toward the three main priorities of most emergencies--life safety, incident stability, and
property/environment conservation.Within ICS, incident command is organized into five major components: the
command function, the planning section, the operations section, the logistics section, and the finance/administra-
tion section.When multiple agencies or jurisdictions are involved in a response, ICS provides for and can evolve
into a unified command, with a decisionmaker from each key agency represented at the incident command level.
For the system being used on 9/11, see, e.g., Arlington County,Virginia, report,Titan Systems Corp., "Arlington
County: After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon," 2002, pp.
11, A-20­A-21.
191. Grant C. Peterson, "Introduction: Arlington County and the After-Action Report," July 28, 2003 (pre-
sented at conference in Arlington,Va.,"Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the
Pentagon").
192. For the death toll, see FBI report, list of Pentagon victims, undated. For patient care and victim disposi-
tion, see Arlington County,"After-Action Report," pp. B-1, B-12­B-15.
193. For reasons the response was mainly a success, see Arlington County, "After-Action Report," pp. 11­12;
Edward Plaugher interview (Oct. 16, 2003). For preparations for the International Monetary Fund and the World
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