of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel W, p. 26. For others climbing
toward the impact zone, see PAPD statement 4, Administration Command, Nov. 24, 2001.
152. For the PAPD Superintendent and inspector's ascent, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command, Nov. 12,
2001. For the PAPD Chief 's and officers' ascent, see PANYNJ statement 1, Feb. 1, 2002. For the calls to the PAPD
desk, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, chan-
nel 10, pp. 1617.
153. For officers responding on their own initiative, see PAPD interview 8, JFK Command (Mar. 31, 2004);
PAPD statement 11, WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For the desk's instructions, see PAPD statement 10, Port
Authority Bus Terminal Command, Mar. 20, 2002; PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003). For
formulating an ad hoc plan, see PAPD interview 3, LaGuardia Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD statement 6, Port
Authority Bus Terminal Command, Jan. 4, 2002. For poor situational awareness, see PAPD statement 7, Adminis-
trative Command, Jan. 6, 2002; PAPD interview 8, JFK Command (Mar. 31, 2004). For the lack of equipment, see
PAPD interview 9, LaGuardia Command (Apr. 1, 2004); PAPD statement 13, Port Newark Command, Mar. 5,
2002.
154. On the PAPD officer reaching the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2003).
For the PAPD teams, see PAPD, statement 4, Administrative Command, Nov. 24, 2001; PAPD interview 1,WTC
Command (Oct. 14, 2003). For the officers climbing, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command, Nov. 12, 2001. For
officers on the ground floors, see PAPD interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003); PAPD
interview 2, Holland Tunnel Command (Oct. 27, 2003); PAPD statement 2,WTC Command, Nov. 10, 2001.
155. On remaining in the bunker, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For the evacuation order, see OEM
interview 4 (Mar. 18, 2004). On liaisons and OEM, see OEM interview 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). For field responders'
placement, see OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004); OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Richard Sheirer interview
(Apr. 7, 2004); OEM interview 7 (Mar. 31, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 25, OEM, Oct. 17, 2001.
156. NIST report,"Progress Report on the Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the WTC," June
18, 2004, appendix H, p. 40.
157. For information about 911 calls, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For people alive on the 92nd
and 79th floors, see ibid.; Civilian interview 5 (May 26, 2004). For civilians being assisted, see PAPD interview 4,
Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 6, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1, 2004); FDNY inter-
view, transcript 10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001. For injured civilians being assisted, see FDNY interview, transcript
10, Battalion 2, Dec. 6, 2001; FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); PAPD interview 6, Lincoln Tunnel
Command (Nov. 24, 2003).
158. For the overall command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For the North Tower lobby,
see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For South Tower staging, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004).
For EMS staging areas, see FDNY interview 32, Chief (Feb. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 35, EMS (Feb. 10, 2004).
159. For situational awareness in North Tower lobby, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For over-
all command post, see FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004).
160. For the collapse's effect on the firefighters, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY
interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 24,
Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20,
2004). For the reaction of firefighters not facing the south, see FDNY interview 7, Battalion 4 (Jan. 9, 2004); FDNY
interview 10, Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 12, Battalion 4 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 26,
Battalion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan.
20, 2004).
161. It is possible that the repeater channel satellite on the roof of 5 WTC was damaged or destroyed when
the South Tower collapsed.That the repeater channel stopped recording transmissions at 9:59 does not mean trans-
missions no longer could be made on it.
162. For the FDNY boat radioing of the collapse, see FDNY recording, FDNY Manhattan Dispatch Chan-
nel, Sept. 11, 2001. For the van being abandoned, see FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004). For the
order one minute after the collapse, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet,
video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For the subsequent order, see FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004).
163. For evacuation instructions, our analysis is based on more than 100 interviews we conducted and our
review of 500 internal FDNY interview transcripts. For three firefighters hearing "imminent collapse," see FDNY
interview, transcript 20, Battalion 10, Jan. 10, 2002; FDNY interview, transcript 23, Battalion 7, Jan. 21, 2002; FDNY
interview, transcript 21, Battalion 8, Jan. 9, 2002.
164. For firefighters hearing orders over tactical 1, see, e.g., FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004);
FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004). For one chief giving the instruction, see FDNY interview 23,
Chief (Jan. 23, 2004).
165. For the chief on the 35th floor and the first instruction, see FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004).
For the chief on the 23rd floor, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 16, Battal-
ion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For the chief on the 35th floor hearing of the South Tower collapse and taking subsequent
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