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126. For the chief 's perspective, see FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For the four companies, see
FDNY interview, transcript 13, Battalion 11, Dec. 12, 2001.
127. FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For finding working elevator in North Tower, see FDNY inter-
view 53, Battalion 11 (Apr. 14, 2004).
128. For the second alarm, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For the other units, see FDNY records,
computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 1377, Sept. 11, 2001, 09:42:45­09:47:05. For some having gone through
the tunnel and responded to the Marriott, see FDNY interview, transcript 15, Battalion 48, Dec. 13, 2001.
129. Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
130. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004); FDNY inter-
view 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9, 2004); FDNY interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan.
28, 2004); FDNY interview 47, Chief (Mar. 11, 2004); OEM interview 6 (Mar. 24, 2004).
131. FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004).
132. Ibid.
133. FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004).
134. For no chief fearing a total collapse, see FDNY interview 45, HQ (Mar. 8, 2004);Thomas Von Essen inter-
view (Apr. 7, 2004); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004); FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY
interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For one chief 's perspective, see FDNY
interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004). For the opinion not being conveyed, see FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004);
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
135. FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).
136. For the fifth alarm, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 2033, Sept. 11, 2001,
09:54:29. On numbers dispatched, see ibid., Sept. 11, 2001, 08:47:20­09:54:29. For the paramedic, see FDNY inter-
view 32, Chief (Feb. 9, 2004).
137. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). Each Level 4 mobilization fields about 1,000 officers.
138. NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004).
139. NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
140. For the ESU team's arrival in the North Tower and attempt to talk with the FDNY chiefs without OEM
intervention, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; NYPD interview 5, ESU (Feb.
19, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004). For the decision to have the ESU team ascend, see NYPD
interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the first ESU team in the South
Tower checking in with the FDNY command post there, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004).
141. For the ESU teams' preparations and one team entering the South Tower, see NYPD interview 15, ESU
(Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004). For the fifth team's status at 9:59, see NYPD interview
15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004); NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004); NYPD interview 7, ESU (Feb. 20, 2004). For
the team at the North Tower, see NYPD interview 11, ESU (Mar. 9, 2004); NYPD interview 10, ESU (Mar. 1,
2004).
142. NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004).
143. New York City Police Museum interview of Kenneth Winkler,Apr. 17, 2003 (videotaped); NYPD inter-
view 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004).
144. NYPD interview 22, Intelligence (June 10, 2004); NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004);
NYPD interview 24, Intelligence (June 15, 2004).
145. NYPD interview 20, Manhattan South Task Force (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 21, 6th Precinct (May
4, 2004); NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 4, Housing (Feb. 17, 2004); PAPD
interview 4, Port Authority Bus Terminal Command (Nov. 20, 2003).
146. NYPD interview 19, 13th Precinct (May 4, 2004); NYPD interview 2,Transit (Jan. 2, 2004).
147. For the instructions to civilians, see NYPD interview 3, HQ (Jan. 15, 2004). For the officers at 5 WTC
and the concourse, see NYPD memo, requests for departmental recognition 3 and 5, June 26, 2002; NYPD memo,
request for departmental recognition 3, June 26, 2002. For officers in the South Tower, see NYPD memo, request
for departmental recognition 6, June 26, 2002; NYPD memo, request for departmental recognition 4, June 26, 2002.
148. For the Chief of Department's instructions, see NYPD interview 8, HQ (Feb. 24, 2004). For the heli-
copter's perspective, see NYPD recordings, City Wide 1 and Special Operations Division radio channels, Sept. 11,
2001. For pilot's belief and the helicopter not hovering, see NYPD interview 12,Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004). For the
other helicopter, see NYPD interview 16, Aviation (Apr. 1, 2004); NYPD interview 1, Aviation (Sept. 26, 2003).
149. For the warning, see NYPD recording, Special Operations Division radio channel, Sept. 11, 2001. For no
pilot predicting a collapse, see, e.g., NYPD interview 12, Aviation (Mar. 10, 2004); NYPD interview 14, Aviation
(Mar. 11, 2004).
150. For the 911 call, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. For the inaccurate conveyance, see NYPD
report, McKinsey & Company,"NYPD Call-routing and Message Dispatch: Draft Summary Report," July 23, 2002.
151. For the initial responders and the assignments, see PAPD statement 3,WTC Command, Nov. 12, 2001;
PAPD statement 12,WTC Command, Mar. 28, 2002. For officers assigned to rescue, see Port Authority transcripts
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
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