Page 565

interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 24, Battalion 6 (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 10,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 20, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004).

114. FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004); FDNY interview 30, Battalion 4 (Jan. 30, 2004); FDNY inter-

view 13, Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 26, Battal-
ion 8 (Jan. 28, 2004).

115. FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12, 2004); FDNY interview 20, Battalion 6 (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY

interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004); FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 13,
Battalion 1 (Jan. 13, 2004); NYPD interview 6, ESU (Feb. 19, 2004); FDNY interview 23, Chief (Jan. 23, 2004);
FDNY interview 25, Battalion 1 (Jan. 23, 2004).

116. For the instruction to return to the lobby, see FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003); Jules Naudet

and Gedeon Naudet video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For the rumor being debunked, the other chief continuing oper-
ations, and no evidence of units returning, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001;
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For the chief in lobby asked about helicopters, see FDNY interview,
transcript 7, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001. For the rejection of helicopters, see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004).

117. For the diminished communications, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY inter-

view, transcript 5, Battalion 6 (Oct. 12, 2001); FDNY interview 42, Field Comm (Feb. 13, 2004); Jules Naudet and
Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 5,
Chief (Dec. 16, 2003). For lobby chiefs hearing nothing in response, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004);
FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003).

118. For firefighters on the 54th floor, see NYPD interview 23, Intelligence (June 10, 2004). For firefighters

on the 44th floor, see PAPD interview 7,WTC Command (Nov. 25, 2004). For firefighters between the 5th and
37th floors, see, e.g., FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004); FDNY interview 40, Battalion 4 (Feb. 12,
2004).

119. For their commencing operations, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept.

11, 2001. For OEM field responder joining, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For units not rerouting to South
Tower, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept.
11, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion 10 (Jan.
10, 2001).

120. For the ladder company in stairwell B, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel),

Sept. 11, 2001. For the other ladder company, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). For the senior chief 's perspec-
tive, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.

121. Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.
122. For the chiefs' situational awareness, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel),

Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); FDNY 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); FDNY interview 43,
Chief (Mar. 3, 2004). For the senior chief 's perspective, see Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater
channel), Sept. 11, 2001.

123. Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. It is unknown whether the

lobby chief ceased to communicate on the repeater channel because of technical problems or because he simply
switched channels in order to be able to communicate with chiefs outside the South Tower.The FDNY strongly
maintains that there must have been a technical problem resulting from the impact of one of the planes, because
they do not believe this chief would have switched channels without first so advising on the repeater channel. FDNY
letter to the Commission, July, 2, 2004. However, the repeater channel subsequently worked very well for FDNY
personnel on the 78th floor and in an elevator on the 40th floor. Port Authority recording, WTC channel 30
(repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001.

124. FDNY interview 37, Battalion 35 (Feb. 10, 2004); FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY

interview, transcript 11, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001.

125. On the need for more companies, see FDNY interview 6, HQ (Jan. 8, 2004). For only two units being

dispatched, see OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); Port Authority recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel),
Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 4, Battalion 4, Oct. 9, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 20, Battalion
10, Jan. 10, 2001. For the delayed dispatch, see FDNY records, computer-aided dispatch report, alarm box 8087,
Sept. 11, 2001, 09:03:0009:10:02. For units staged at the Brooklyn-Battery tunnel, see ibid., alarm box 1377, Sept.
11, 2001, 08:52:5909:47:05. On units who parked and walked, see FDNY interview 46, Battalion 10 (Mar. 9,
2004); FDNY interview, transcript 24, Battalion 35, Jan. 25, 2002; FDNY interview, transcript 22, Battalion 7, Jan.
16, 2002. For confusion about the towers, see FDNY interview, transcript 8, Chief, Oct. 23, 2001; Port Authority
recording,WTC channel 30 (repeater channel), Sept. 11, 2001. On the inability to find the staging area, see FDNY
interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20, 2001. On jumpers
and debris, see FDNY interview 2, Battalion 48 (Dec. 15, 2003); FDNY interview 22, Battalion 28 (Jan. 22, 2004);
FDNY interview 39, Battalion 35 (Feb. 11, 2004); FDNY interview, transcript 11, Battalion 32, Dec. 12, 2001;
FDNY interview, transcript 15, Battalion 48, Dec. 13, 2001; FDNY interview, transcript 17, Battalion 12, Dec. 20,
2001.

548

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 548