Page 561

a major incident had occurred, see, e.g., Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004).
Some of them could actually feel the heat from the explosion in the North Tower. See, e.g., Civilian interview 10
(Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004). For people deciding to leave or being advised to do so by
fire wardens, see, e.g., Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian statement
1, undated. For Morgan Stanley occupying 20 floors and ordering its employees to leave, see Civilian interview 19
(June 6, 2004).

45. Port Authority, transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio channels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, chan-

nel 17, p. 1; PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). Fire command stations were equipped with manuals containing
prescripted announcements corresponding to a number of specified emergencies. Once the FDNY arrived on the
scene, however, all decisions relating to evacuation or other emergency procedures were left to its discretion.

46. When a notable event occurred, it was standard procedure for the on-duty deputy fire safety director to

make an "advisory" announcement to tenants who were affected by or might be aware of the incident, in order to
acknowledge the incident and to direct tenants to stand by for further instructions. The purpose of advisory
announcements, as opposed to "emergency" announcements (such as to evacuate), was to reduce panic. PANYNJ
interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For the content of
the announcement, see, e.g., Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 3 (May 4, 2004);
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian statement 1, undated. For the protocol and prescripted announce-
ments and the death of the director of fire safety and the deputy fire safety director, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June
2, 2004); PANYNJ interview 12 (July 7, 2004). For people not thinking a second plane would hit, see, e.g., PANYNJ
interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the quotation, see FDNY interview 63, Chief (May 16, 2004). For civilians remain-
ing, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23,
2004); Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA concerning the Sep-
tember 11 attacks. For civilians returning after evacuating, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian inter-
view 11 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to OSHA
concerning the September 11 attacks.

47. For advice on the ground floor, see Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004). Nineteen of them returned upstairs,

where 18 died; the 20th was told by her supervisor, who was in the group, to leave rather than return upstairs.The
supervisor also survived. Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004). For advice in the sky lobbies, see, e.g., Civilian inter-
view 15 (Apr. 21, 2004). For security officials not being part of the fire safety staff, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June
2, 2004).

48. For people told to stand by, see Port Authority transcripts of recorded Port Authority calls and radio chan-

nels, Sept. 11, 2001, vol. II, channel 8, pp. 78. For people advised to leave, see ibid., vol. II, channel 9, pp. 2, 4, 9.

49. It is also not known if the deputy fire safety director received the order by the PAPD to evacuate the com-

plex; however, the Port Authority has told us that deputy fire safety directors did not generally take direct orders
from the PAPD under the regular chain of command. PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004). For the announce-
ment, see Civilian interview 16 (Apr. 27, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004). For the announcement's
deviating from protocol, see PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004).

50. For senior leaders' response by 9:00

., see FDNY interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004); FDNY interview

54, Chief (Apr. 15, 2004); FDNY interview 5, Chief (Dec. 16, 2003); FDNY interview 52, Chief (Apr. 5, 2004);
FDNY interview 27, HQ (Jan. 28, 2004). For the Chief of Department's and Chief of Operation's actions, see FDNY
interview 18, Chief (Jan. 22, 2004). For senior leaders' response by 9:59, see FDNY report, McKinsey & Company,
"FDNY Report," Aug. 19, 2002, p. 32.

51. FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); see FDNY record, computer-aided dispatch report, Sept. 11,

2001, 08:47:209:00:00.

52. For the chief 's and companies' arrival, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001;

FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For burned civilians, see FDNY interview 29, Battalion 1 (Jan. 29, 2004).
For the building's physical conditions, see FDNY interview 16, Battalion 1 (Jan. 20, 2004). For conditions in the
lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001.

53. For the initial incident commander and command post location, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet,

video footage, Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004). For the transfer of incident command, see
FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004). For ascertaining building systems' status from building personnel, see
FDNY interview 4, Chief (Jan. 8, 2004); PANYNJ interview 13 (Nov. 20, 2003); FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan.
14, 2004). For speaking with OEM and PAPD officials, see FDNY interview 15, Chief (Jan. 14, 2004); Jules Naudet
and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001.

54. For the ladder and engine companies' climb, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr. 22, 2004); Jules

Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11, 2001. For tactical 1, see FDNY interview 59, Battalion 2 (Apr.
22, 2004). For other units lining up in the lobby, see Jules Naudet and Gedeon Naudet, video footage, Sept. 11,
2001.

55. For FDNY instructing building personnel and PAPD to evacuate the South Tower, see FDNY interview

544

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 544