Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For the fire alarm, see PANYNJ interview 10 (June
16, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004).
10. Port Authority memorandum to Commission for Nov. 3, 2003 meeting;WTC interview 6 (May 25, 2004).
11. For fire safety teams, see PANYNJ Interview 7 (Jun. 2, 2004). For fire drill procedures, see Civilian inter-
view 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For aids to the September 11 evacuation, see, e.g.,
Civilian interview 14 (Apr. 7, 2004); Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 21 (May 4, 2004);
Civilian Interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004).
12. For instructions to civilians, see, e.g., Civilian interview 20 (May 4, 2004); Civilian interview 21 (May 4,
2004); Civilian interview 12 (May 4, 2004); Stanley Praimnath testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped). For civilians'
participation, see Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004); Civilian interview 15 (Apr. 21, 2004); Commission analy-
sis of letters written to OSHA concerning the September 11 attacks. For civilians not being instructed not to evac-
uate up, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004). For the standard fire drill announcement, see Port Authority
response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For civilians' recollection, see Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004);
Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 10 (Mar. 24, 2004). For Port Authority acknowledgment
of lack of a protocol, see PANYNJ interview 2 (Apr. 14, 2004).
13. For SPI transition, see PANYNJ Interview 11 (Jun. 23, 2004);Alan Reiss prepared statement, May 18, 2004,
p. 8. For fire safety plan, see PANYNJ Interview 8 (June 6, 2004).
14. See Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) report, "Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,"
undated (online at www.panynj.gov).
15. PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004).
16. For 40,000 officers, see NYPD information provided to the Commission, July 9, 2004. For standard oper-
ating procedures, see NYPD regulations, "Patrol Guide: Rapid Mobilization," and "Patrol Guide: Mobilization
Readiness Levels," Jan. 1, 2000.
17. For the 35 radio zones, see NYPD report,"Radio Zones," undated. For other citywide radio channels, see,
e.g., NYPD report,"Transit Patrol VHF," undated; NYPD interview 18, ESU (Feb. 24, 2004).
18. For the NYPD supervising the emergency call system and employing more than 1,200 people, see NYPD
report,"Communications Section," undated (online at www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/otsd/ commsec.html). For
fire emergencies being transferred to the FDNY dispatch, see FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004).
19. See FDNY email to the Commission, July 9, 2004;Thomas Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For oper-
ations being headed by the sole five-star chief, see FDNY regulations,"Regulations" chapter of "Operational Pro-
cedures and Policies," July 1999.
20. For department organization, see FDNY report,"Unit Location Chart," Sept. 11, 2001; FDNY regulations,
"Firefighting Procedures,""Engine Company," and "Ladder Company Operations" chapters of "Operational Pro-
cedures and Policies," July 1999.
21. FDNY interview 48, SOC (Mar. 11, 2004).
22. FDNY interview 28, Dispatch (Jan. 29, 2004). Each center was staffed at all times with a supervisor and
seven dispatchers who worked in 12-hour tours. Positions included a decision dispatcher, responsible for directing
the appropriate fire apparatus to the scene; a voice alarm or notification dispatcher, responsible for intra- and inter-
agency communications; a radio in and radio out dispatcher who tracked the movement of fire apparatuses; and
three alarm dispatchers, responsible for sending the appropriate number of units to a fire scene to correspond with
the designated alarm level. Ibid.
23. FDNY regulations,"Communications" chapter of "Operational Procedures and Policies," July 1999; FDNY
interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); FDNY interview 64, HQ (June 30, 2004).
24. FDNY report,"Report from the Chief of Department,Anthony L. Fusco," in Manning, ed., The World Trade
Center Bombing, p. 11.
25. PANYNJ interview 1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004). In early 2001, New York pro-
vided its firefighters with new digital radios.The procurement process for these radios remains controversial, and
they proved unpopular with the rank and file, who believed that adequate training in their use had not been pro-
vided.The new radios were withdrawn shortly after they had been introduced into the field.While the new radios
briefly were in service, the WTC repeater channel could be left on at all times, because the new radios operated
on entirely different frequencies and thus were not vulnerable to interference from the repeater system. Thomas
Von Essen interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For the new radios permitting the repeater to stay on, see PANYNJ interview
1 (Nov. 6, 2003); PANYNJ interview 4 (May 10, 2004).
26. For civilian fatalities, see New York City press release, Office of the Mayor Press Release No. 042-01, Feb.
8, 2001. For firefighter fatalities, see Terry Golway, So Others Might Live (Basic Books, 2002), p. 304.
27. For the creation of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), see Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr.
20, 2004). For OEM's purposes, see Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004). For OEM's sending field responder,
see ibid.; OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). Other data monitored by OEM's Watch Command included Emer-
gency Medical Service data regarding patterns of illness (to spot a potential epidemic in its early stages), live video
feeds from New York Harbor and city streets, and television news channels. Richard Sheirer interview (Apr. 7, 2004);
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