rying specific passengers. See FAA security directives, SD 108-98, July 27, 2001; SD 108-00, July 27, 2001; SD 108-
00, July 27, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 21, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 31, 2001. In order to issue more general warnings
without directing carriers to take specific action, the FAA issued Information Circulars. Of the eight such circu-
lars issued between July 2 and September 11, 2001, five highlighted possible threats overseas. See FAA information
circulars, "Possible Terrorist Threat--Arabian Peninsula," IC-2001-11, July 18, 2001; "Recent Terrorist Activity in
the Middle East," IC-2001-03B, July 26, 2001; "Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation," IC-2001-
04A, July 31, 2001; "Violence Increases in Israel," IC-2001-07A, Aug. 28, 2001; "ETA Bombs Airports in Spain,"
IC-2001-13, Aug. 29, 2001. One, issued on August 16, warned about the potential use of disguised weapons. FAA
information circular,"Disguised Weapons," IC-2001-12, Aug. 16, 2001.
49. See Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; NSC memo, U.S.Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001; FBI elec-
interview (June 23, 2004).
not take any special actions to respond to it.The special agent in charge of the Miami Field Office told us he did
not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11. See Washington Field Office agent interview (Apr.
1, 2004); Hector Pesquera interview (Oct. 3, 2003).
52. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); Thomas Pickard testimony, Apr. 13, 2004;
this dispute. Pickard recalls the alleged statement being made at a briefing on July 12.The Department of Justice
has informed us that the only people present at that briefing were Pickard,Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson, and Ashcroft's chief of staff, David Ayres. There are no records of the discussions at these briefings.
Thompson and Ayres deny Ashcroft made any such statement. Dale Watson, who did not attend any of the brief-
ings, told us that Pickard complained after one of the briefings that Ashcroft did not want to be briefed on the
threats because "nothing ever happened." Ruben Garcia, head of the FBI's Criminal Division, who attended some
of Pickard's briefings of the Attorney General but not the one at which Pickard alleges Ashcroft made the state-
ment, recalls that Ashcroft was "not enthusiastic" about the classified portions of the briefings that related to coun-
terterrorism.We have been told that Pickard and Ashcroft did not have a good relationship.This may have influenced
their views on the facts surrounding their meetings. Larry Thompson interview (Jan. 29, 2004); Dale Watson inter-
view (June 3, 2004); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004);Thompson and Ayres letter to the Commission, July
12, 2004.
rather than be renewed with continuing inaccuracies. Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Marion Bow-
man interview (Mar. 6, 2004).
investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft); FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001.
9/11. For analysis, see Intelligence report, Retrospective review of 11 September 2001 hijackers' activities, Sept. 23,
2002.
Tenet conceded in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the Kuala Lumpur meeting took on additional signifi-
cance once Khallad was identified as having attended the meeting. See Joint Inquiry report, p. 149.
mony, see, e.g., FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001; FBI emails between Al S. and
Michael D., re: source, Jan. 9-11, 2001; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 4, 2001; DOJ
Inspector General interview of Jennifer M., Dec. 9, 2002. For the views of the FBI investigators, see DOJ Inspec-