edge that the commander of al Faruq training camp was known to urge trainees to swear bayat. Moreover, peer
pressure certainly appears to have been a factor in swaying recruits to choose "martyrdom." Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004.
100. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan.
101. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan.
7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2003.
102. CIA analytic report,"Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot," June 20, 2003, pp. 23.
103. Ibid., p. 8; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.
104. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 14, 2004. For descrip-
tion of martyrdom video filming, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 21, 2004.
105. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,
Aug. 20, 2003; Apr. 13, 2004; Apr. 5, 2004; Apr. 3, 2004.
Dates of U.S. visas obtained in 2000:Ahmed al Ghamdi (September 3), Saeed al Ghamdi (September 4), Hamza
al Ghamdi (October 17), Mohand al Shehri (October 23),Wail and Waleed al Shehri (October 24),Ahmed al Nami
(October 28), Ahmad al Haznawi (November 12), Majed Moqed (November 20), and Satam al Suqami (Novem-
ber 21). Five Saudi muscle hijackers obtained visas in 2001: Ahmed al Nami (April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi (June
12),Khalid al Mihdhar (June 13), Abdul Aziz Omari (June 18) and Salem al Hazmi (June 20). For Nami, Ghamdi,
and Mihdhar, this was their second visa, and each applied using a new passport. Banihammad, the only non-Saudi
muscle hijacker, also obtained his visa much later than most of the Saudi muscle hijackers, on June 18, 2001. See
Commission analysis of DOS records; CIA analytic report,"The Plot and the Plotters," June 1, 2003, p. 55.Accord-
ing to KSM, the three hijackers who obtained their first visas much later than the others were not replacements
for unsuccessful candidates. KSM simply wanted to get as many hijackers into the United States as possible to
enhance the odds for success, even if each flight ended up with as many as six or seven. Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
106. Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered after 9/11. Both had been
doctored. According to KSM, two hijacker passports were damaged in the doctoring process. These may have
belonged to Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Nami, as both acquired new passports and new U.S. visas, although
the old visas were still valid. Of the hijacker visa applications we were able to review, all were incomplete.Tourist
visas were granted anyway. On obtaining "clean" passports and the two damaged passports, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003. Wail and Waleed al Shehri had a family member in the Saudi
passport office who provided them with new passports for their trip to the United States. See CIA analytic report,
Al Qaeda Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Jan. 2004, p. 12.
107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar.
20, 2004. The candidate operatives were
1. Muhammad Mani Ahmad al Kahtani. Currently in custody, he is the last known Saudi mus-
cle candidate to be sent to the United States, in early August 2001, to round out the number of hijackers.
As discussed later in this chapter, he was refused entry. Secretary of Defense interview with David Frost
(BBC), June 27, 2004, available at www.defenselink.mil. CIA analytic report, "Threat Threads: Recent
Advances in Understanding 11 September," CTC 2002-30086CH, Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 3, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 3, 2003.
2. Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. He traveled to Afghanistan illegally after being prohibited by
Saudi authorities from leaving Saudi Arabia.After being assigned to a mission in the U.S., he secretly reen-
tered the Kingdom but failed in an attempt to have his name removed from the list of prohibited travel-
ers so that he could obtain a U.S. visa. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 20, 2002;
Oct. 4, 2002; Apr. 3, 2003.
3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to have
been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a later, even larger operation.
Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelli-
gence reports, interrogations of Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003.
4 and 5. Saeed al Baluchi and Qutaybah al Najdi. Both were sent to Saudi Arabia via Bahrain,
where Najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security officials. Both were so frightened by
the experience that they withdrew from the operation. KSM urged Baluchi to obtain a U.S. visa, but
Baluchi refused, fearing that he might be watchlisted at the U.S. embassy. See Intelligence report, interro-
gation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; July 3, 2003;
Feb. 20, 2004.
6. Zuhair al Thubaiti: He has reportedly admitted membership in al Qaeda, stating "proudly" that
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 525