2002--conflicts with the organization's preference for having its 9/11 operatives concentrate on that mission exclu-
sively.
4. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.According to Hambali, in late 1999 or early 2000
vided Hambali with two addresses--one in the United States ("possibly in California") and one in South Africa--
and told Hambali he could contact "people in those locations" if he "needed help." Hambali claims he never
contacted anyone at either address or passed either address to anyone else, and claims not to remember the addresses.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. In an assessment of KSM's reporting, the CIA con-
cluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part" of KSM's resistance efforts. For
example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than satis-
factory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open new email accounts. CIA report, Intelligence
Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammed's Threat Reporting--Precious Truths, Sur-
rounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 45.
dhar) journeyed to Kuala Lumpur in late 1999 and early 2000.
7. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003;Aug. 14, 2003. KSM also has stated that in addi-
sibly covering Long Beach, California." Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004.
ond half of January. FBI searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments in Culver
City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our own investigation. See FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003
(Apr. 3, 1999, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134); Commission
investigation in Culver City;Vicki G. interview (Sept. 30, 2003).
ing indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque.A scholar lecturing at the mosque was
reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil inter-
view (Feb. 24, 2004). On "Khallam," see FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; FBI
electronic communication,"Ziyat Kharfan," Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor with whom Hazmi and Mih-
dhar met at mosque).The Khallam story has never been corroborated.The FBI considered the possibility that Khal-
lam might be Khallad, the al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in chapter
5.This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States in June 2000 and was seen in the
company of Fahad al Thumairy, an imam at the mosque. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bomb-
ing, interview of witness, Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI have
found any travel documentation establishing Khallad's presence in the United States at any time.We doubt that the
person allegedly seen with Thumairy actually was Khallad.
uary 2000,Thumairy was employed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and
Religious Guidance, to act as the consulate's liaison to the mosque. FBI electronic communication,"Fahad Al Thu-
mairy," Sept. 4, 2002. Before 9/11, Saudi imams employed by the ministry often were dispatched to help serve Mus-
lim communities around the world, sometimes--as in Thumairy's case--with diplomatic status in the host country.
On Thumairy's leadership, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al
Muhanna, July 9, 2003; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Ibrahim Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002.
12. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Khaled Charif, Dec. 4, 2002. After 9/11, arguments arose
Saudi government in the United States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman
al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least in Thumairy's case, by refus-
ing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl Hoffman to the Commission, June 8, 2004, and the attached
materials.
mairy and used to hear him preach at the King Fahd mosque deny that he promoted extremism. Sami A. Mekhe-
mar interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Despite the disparate views as to whether Thumairy