224. For Annex B, see NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated (attached to NSC
options to eliminate weapons of mass destruction that the al Qaeda network might acquire or make.
226. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
227. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
228. Ibid.
229. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
230. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,"Courtesy call on AG," Feb. 22, 2001.
231. On the FBI strategy, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Program,"Strate-
Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On the FBI budget proposal, see statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. See DOJ memo, Com-
ments on Staff Statement 12, Apr. 7, 2004.
mittee, May 9, 2001. On DOJ's priorities, see DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components,
"Guidance for Preparing FY 2003 Budgets," May 10, 2001. On Watson's reaction, see Dale Watson interview (Jan.
6, 2004).
to reconsider DOJ's denial of the FBI's original counterterrorism budget request in light of the continuing threat.
It was not uncommon for FBI budget requests to be reduced by the attorney general or by OMB before being
submitted to Congress; this had occurred during the previous administration.
shared with criminal prosecutors and the nature of the walls between the intelligence and law enforcement func-
tions within the FBI. In March 2001, Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the FISA Court, chastised the FBI,
sending a letter to Ashcroft announcing he was banning an offending supervisory agent from appearing before the
court. Judge Lamberth also met personally with Ashcroft and his acting deputy, Robert Mueller, to complain about
the performance of the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). Judge Lamberth letter to
Ashcroft, Mar. 9, 2001; John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). In May 2001, Ashcroft altered the FISA applica-
tion process to ensure greater accuracy. See DOJ memo,Ashcroft to Freeh,"The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) Process," May 18, 2001.
This was the third report in as many years by a government agency indicating that the procedures were not work-
ing as planned. In October 2000, December 2000, and March 2001, proposals for reform to the 1995 procedures
were put forth by senior DOJ officials. None resulted in reform. One impediment was that the respective DOJ
components could not agree on all the proposed reforms. A second impediment was a concern that such reforms
would require a challenge to the FISA Court's position on the matter.This was considered risky because the FISA
Court of Review had never convened, and one of the judges had previously voiced skepticism regarding the con-
stitutionality of the FISA statute. Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson did ask the court to accept the mod-
ifications described in the text, which were distributed as part of his August 2001 memorandum reaffirming the
1995 procedures. See DOJ memo, Thompson to the Criminal Division, the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review, and the FBI,"Intelligence Sharing," Aug. 6, 2001.
(Feb. 7, 2004). Attorney General John Ashcroft told us he told Rice on March 7, 2001, that his lawyers had deter-
mined that the existing legal authorities for covert action against Bin Ladin were unclear and insufficient, and that
he suggested new, explicit kill authorities be developed. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. On the CIA draft
documents, see CIA memo,"Talking Points for the DCI on the Draft Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finding and
the Draft UBL MON," Mar. 27, 2001. For the description of the meeting, see CIA memo, Moseman to Tenet, Mar.
28, 2001.
237. See, e.g., NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 23, 2000; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).