202. See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
203. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
204. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
205. DOS cable, State 111711,"Demarche on Threat by Afghan-based Terrorists," June 27, 2001. Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman knew of Sheehan's severe demands and instructed Ambassador
Milam to reiterate them to the Taliban. Marc Grossman interview (Jan. 20, 2004).
206. In early July 2001, shortly before retiring,Ambassador Milam met one last time with Taliban Deputy For-
eign Minister Jalil in Islamabad. Milam tried to dispel any confusion about where Bin Ladin fit into U.S.-Taliban
relations--the Saudi terrorist was the issue, and he had to be expelled. DOS cable, Islamabad 3628,"Taliban's Mul-
lah Jalil's July 2 Meeting With The Ambassador," July 3, 2001.The State Department's South Asia bureau called for
a less confrontational stance toward the Taliban. It opposed a policy to overthrow the Taliban and was cautious about
aiding the Northern Alliance. DOS memo, Rocca to Grossman,"Your Participation in Deputies Committee Meet-
ing, Friday, June 29, 2001," June 28, 2001; see DOS memo,"Pakistan/Afghanistan DC-Covert Action Issue," undated
(appears to be mid-June 2001); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
207. For the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of June 29, 2001,
Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For
officials who were impatient with the pace of the Deputies' Committee review, see, e.g., Richard Armitage inter-
view (Jan. 12, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). For Clarke's arguments, see NSC memo, PCC
Chairman's Summary Paper,"Key Issues for Al-Qida Deputies Meeting,"Apr. 19, 2001. See also Richard Armitage
testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
208. For Clarke and Black renewing their push, see, e.g., Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003). For Clarke's sug-
gestion, see NSC email, Cressey to Moran, various matters concerning al Qaeda, Feb. 12, 2001.
209. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004); Zalmay Khalilzad inter-
view (Nov. 21, 2003). For Clarke's view, see NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.
210. For the draft authorities, see CIA briefing materials, talking points for DCI meeting with Rice on the
draft Afghanistan counterterrorism finding and the draft UBL Memorandum of Notification, Mar. 28, 2001. For
the draft explicitly stating that the goal was not to overthrow the Taliban, see Jonathan F. interview (Jan. 19, 2004).
211. See NSC email, Clarke to Khalilzad, Crawford, and Cressey, "Option for integrated al Qida-Afghan-
Pakistan paper," June 30, 2001. For State's view, see DOS memo,"U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin
Laden," undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 16, 2001).
212. For an outline of the policy, see NSC memo,"Afghanistan:A Comprehensive Strategy," undated (attached
to NSC memo, Biegun memo to executive secretaries, Sept. 7, 2001). For the September 10 meeting, see NSC
memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meet-
ing on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001.
213. For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclu-
sions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001. For
Armitage's view, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
214. Colin Powell prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 5.
215. For reviewing the possibility of more carrots, see DOS memo, Hull and Usrey to Grossman, "Deputies
Committee Meeting on Terrorism and al Qaida," Apr. 20, 2001. For the possibility of lifting sanctions, see Colin
Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOS memo,"Engagement with Pak-
istan: From Negative to Positive," undated (appears to be May 29, 2001).
216. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
217. For Rice's view on Sattar, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Sattar urging the United
States to engage the Taliban, see DOS cable, State 109130,"The Secretary's Lunch With Pakistani Foreign Minis-
ter Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001. For the deputies agreeing to review objectives, see NSC memo, Summary of Con-
clusions of June 29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive
secretaries, July 6, 2001). For Clarke urging Hadley, see NSC memo, Clarke to Hadley,"DC on Pakistan," June 27,
2001.
218. See White House letter, President Bush to Musharraf, Aug. 4, 2001. For Rocca's view, see DOS memo,
"Engagement with Pakistan: From Negative to Positive," undated (possibly May 29, 2001); Christina Rocca inter-
view (Jan. 29, 2004). For Armitage's comment, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
219. For the Vice President's call, see CIA briefing materials,"Efforts to Counter the Bin Ladin Threat," Sept.
12, 2001. For Powell's meetings, see DOS cable, State 041824,"Secretary's 26 February Meeting With Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah," Mar. 8, 2001; DOS cable, State 117132, "The Secretary's June 29 Meeting With Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah," July 5, 2001.
220. Paul Wolfowitz interview (Jan. 20, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).
221. For Shelton's recollection, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Sheridan's departure, see Austin
Yamada interview (Dec. 23, 2003); Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
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