briefing is recounted in some detail in Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 3435.
160. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
161. NSC briefing materials,"CT Briefing for Bush-Cheney Transition Team, APNSA-Designate Rice,"Pol-
President Bush remarks,Warsaw University, June 15, 2001.
and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Harvard Univ. Press, 1995). As the Executive Director of the Commis-
sion, Zelikow has recused himself from our work on the Clinton-Bush transition at the National Security Council.
167. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
168. Ibid.
169. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003). As
Paul Kurtz told the Commission that even though Clarke complained about losing his seat on the Principals Com-
mittee on terrorism issues, Kurtz saw no functional change in Clarke's status. Paul Kurtz interviews (Dec. 16, 2003;
Dec. 22, 2003).
171. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
172. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001 (italics and underlining of the word urgently
Day Plan" that called for cabinet-level decisions on the Northern Alliance, Uzbekistan, Predator, and the Cole. See
NSC memo, Fenzel to Rice, Feb. 16, 2001. Other requests for early PCs are found in NSC email, Fenzel to Hadley,
"Early PC Meeting Priorities," Feb. 2, 2001; NSC email, Cressey to NSC Front Office,"TNT Meeting Priorities,"
Feb. 7, 2001; NSC email, Cressey to Moran,"Aid to NA," Feb. 12, 2001; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, Mar. 2, 2001.
174.The Bush administration held 32 Principals Committee meetings on subjects other than al Qaeda before
us the Administration did not need a principals meeting on al Qaeda because it knew that al Qaeda was a major
threat. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004) Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004.
needs to know that if you're going to attack, you'll be hit very hard and very quick. It's not time for diplomacy and
debate. It's time for action." Associated Press,"Cheney: Swift Retaliation Needed," Oct. 13, 2000.
177. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.
178. NSC memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney, Feb. 15, 2001.
179. CIA briefing materials,"UBL Strategic Overview and USS COLE Attack Update," Mar. 27, 2001.These
email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley, "BIN LADIN on the USS COLE," Mar. 2, 2001. A few weeks later, Cressey
wrote Hadley that while the law enforcement investigation went on,"we know all we need to about who did the
attack to make a policy decision." NSC email, Cressey to Hadley,"Need for Terrorism DC Next Week," Mar. 22,
2001.Around this time, Clarke wrote Rice and Hadley that the Yemeni prime minister had told State Department
counterterrorism chief Hull that while Yemen was not saying so publicly,Yemen was 99 percent certain that Bin
Ladin was responsible for the Cole. NSC email, Clarke to NSC Front Office, "Yemen's View on the USS Cole,"
Mar. 24, 2001. In June, Clarke wrote Rice and Hadley that a new al Qaeda video claimed responsibility for the
Cole. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Al Qida Video Claims Responsibility for Cole Attack," June 21,
2001. Later that month, two Saudi jihadists arrested by Bahraini authorities during the threat spike told their cap-
tors that their al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had held celebratory parties over the Cole attack. NSC email,