intelligence analyst told us that, unassisted, he could read and digest the universe of intelligence reporting on al
Qaeda financial issues in the three years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
"FTAT SCIF," May 17, 2001;Treasury memo, Newcomb to Sloan, "Response to Romey Memo," May 23, 2001.
Despite post-9/11 declarations to the contrary, on the eve of 9/11 FTAT had funds appropriated, but no people
hired, no security clearances, and no space to work.Treasury memo, Newcomb to Dam,"Establishing the Foreign
Asset Tracking Center,"Aug. 3, 2001. One Treasury official described CIA's posture as "benign neglect" toward the
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC), and characterized the CIA as believing that financial tracking
had limited utility. Treasury memo, Mat Burrows to O'Neill, "Your PC on Counterterrorism on 4 September,"
Sept. 4, 2001. National Security Advisor Rice told us she and her staff had determined by spring 2001 that terror-
ist financing proposals were a good option, so Treasury continued to plan to establish an office for 24 financing ana-
lysts. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). In fact, as noted above, Treasury failed to follow through on the
establishment of the FTATC until after 9/11.
as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pres-
sure. Others, such as the regulation of money remitters within the United States, were mired in bureaucratic iner-
tia and a general antiregulatory environment. In any event, it is an open question whether such legislative or
regulatory initiatives would have significantly harmed al Qaeda, which generally made little use of the U.S. finan-
cial system to move or store its money.
92. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries,"Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
93. PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May
Mar. 9, 2000.
95. NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries,"Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
96. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 9. Congress had authorized the Alien Terrorist Removal Court at the request
useful." NSC email, Berger's office to executive secretaries,"Millennium Alert After Action Review," Mar. 9, 2000.
Indeed, it had not been used at all.
in 2000 was a directive to CIA to ensure that names (and aliases) of terrorists were collected and disseminated to
State, INS, and the FBI in a timely way, so that the border agencies could place them on a watchlist and the FBI
could identify them in the United States.
99. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec.
took the comment as a presidential instruction to take another look at what additional actions could be taken against
Bin Ladin. Given diplomatic failures to directly pressure the Taliban through Pakistan, the NSC staff saw increased
support to the Northern Alliance and Uzbeks as alternative options. NSC memo,"The Millennium Terrorist Alert--
Next Steps," undated.
502503, 517519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). "Richard" told us the attack had already occurred when
CIA headquarters heard about it;"within this building, they were breathless," he remarked.The CIA concern was
apparently over possible casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin's possible loca-
tion, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban.Tenet did not recall the incident, saying it was no doubt
just "a blip" on his screen within the context of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).The
incident was, however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept in the loop
in the future. NSC memo,"Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).
teams were deployed to Afghanistan to meet with Massoud on March 1321, 2000, and possibly on April 2428,