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88. Shehhi and other members of the group used to frequent a library in Hamburg to use the Internet.Accord-
ing to one of the librarians, in 1999 Shehhi, unprompted, inveighed against America, and boasted that "something
was going to happen" and that "there would be thousands of dead people." FBI electronic communication, sum-
mary of testimony of Angela Duile on Aug. 28, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Oct. 27, 2003.Another witness who lived in
the same dormitory as Motassadeq testified that in late 1998 or early 1999, he overheard a conversation in which
Motassadeq told someone that "we will do something bad again" and that "we will dance on their graves." The
conversation also contained a reference to the "burning of people." FBI electronic communication, summary of
testimony of Holger Liszkowski on Sept. 9, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Nov. 17, 2003. On another occasion, according
to the same witness, Motassadeq apparently identified Atta as "our pilot."Another witness recalled Atta ominously
observing in 1999 that the United States was not omnipotent and that "something can be done." German BKA
investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov. 20, 2001.
89. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 7, 2002; May 20, 2003.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 20, 2003. A detainee has confirmed Binalshibh's
account about being advised to go to Afghanistan rather than trying to travel directly to Chechnya.The detainee
dates the Slahi meeting to October 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 17, 2003.The detainee,
however, also suggests that Slahi and Binalshibh may have met earlier in 1999 in Frankfurt, through a mutual
acquaintance. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 27, 2003.The acquaintance apparently tells a dif-
ferent story, claiming that Slahi introduced him to Binalshibh and Jarrah at Slahi's home in 1997 or 1998, and that
he later lived with them in Hamburg. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, July 2, 2003.
91. FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8; Intelligence reports, interrogations
of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Mar. 4, 2003; May 20, 2003.
92. On meetings with Atef and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002;
Mar. 4, 2003; Mar. 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.Atta reportedly had between
two and five meetings with Bin Ladin before leaving Kandahar and was the only 9/11 hijacker who knew the
entire scope of the operation from the outset. Intelligence report, comments of Binalshibh on Atta, Apr. 21, 2003.
93. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002. According to KSM, Bin Ladin designated
Hazmi to be Atta's second in command. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
94. In addition,Atta obtained a new passport in June 1998, even though his current one was still valid for nearly
a year, a sign that he may have been following the al Qaeda practice of concealing travel to Pakistan. Federal Pros-
ecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 11.
95. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001; Summary of Judgment and Sen-
tencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 19, 2003. Motassadeq continued to han-
dle some of Shehhi's affairs even after Shehhi returned to Hamburg. Most importantly, in March 2000, Motassadeq
paid Shehhi's semester fees at the university, to ensure Shehhi's continued receipt of scholarship payments from the
UAE. Ibid.
96. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. After 9/11, Motassadeq admit-
ted to German authorities that Shehhi had asked him to handle matters in a way that would conceal Shehhi's
absence. Motassadeq also would claim later that he did not know why his friends had gone to Afghanistan, saying
he thought they were planning to go fight in Chechnya. For assistance provided by both Motassadeq and Bahaji,
see Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 13­14.
97. Jarrah encountered a minor problem during his return trip to Hamburg. On January 30, 2000, while tran-
siting Dubai on his way from Karachi to Germany, Jarrah drew questioning from UAE authorities about an over-
lay of the Qu'ran that appeared on one page of his passport.The officials also noticed the religious tapes and books
Jarrah had in his possession, but released him after he pointed out that he had lived in Hamburg for a number of
years and was studying aircraft construction there. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004,
p. 13.
98. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sep. 24, 2002; FBI report, "Summary of Penttbom Inves-
tigation," Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 11, 13.According to a KSM interrogation report, Shehhi may have been present for at
least some of the training that Atta and Binalshibh received in Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Mar. 31, 2004.
99. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003. Binalshibh and the others kept their distance
from Zammar even before visiting Afghanistan and getting their instructions from Bin Ladin and Atef. Ibid.
100. On Atta, see FBI analytic report,"The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model," Feb. 2003, p. 28. On Jarrah,
see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Note that although Jarrah's attitude was
now much more congenial, he told Senguen nothing about being in Afghanistan. On Shehhi's wedding celebra-
tion, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002; on his changed appearance and behav-
ior, see FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 24,
2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
101. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
102. On Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, also known as Ammar al Baluchi, see FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investi-
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