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alternate scenario, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad,Apr. 21, 2004. Khallad has provided contradictory statements about the number of planes to be destroyed
in East Asia. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad,Aug. 13, 2003;Apr. 5, 2004.According to Khallad,Thai-
land, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were likely origins of the flights because Yemenis did not need visas
to enter them. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 13, 2003. For the importance of simultaneity, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.

48. For the four operatives' training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For the elite

nature of the course and Nibras's participation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003;
Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 15, 2003. For KSM's view, see ibid.; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For KSM's visit, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.
20, 2004.

49. For a description of the camp and the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,

July 15, 2003. For Bin Ladin's interest and the decision on the number of trainees, see Intelligence report, interro-
gation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003.

50. For the nature of the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003.

KSM claims that the course proved so rigorous that Mihdhar quit after a week and returned to his family in Yemen.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. However, two of Mihdhar's al Qaeda colleagues who were
present during the training have provided different accounts. Khallad apparently has stated both that Bin Ladin
pulled Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi out of the course early and that Mihdhar actually completed the course. See
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 1, 2003; May 21, 2004. See also FBI report of investigation,
interview of Abu Jandal, Oct. 2, 2001 (indicating that Mihdhar completed the course).

51. For instruction on Western culture and travel, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003;

June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 21, 2003. For KSM's mid-1999 activity and Bin
Ladin's payment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. According to KSM, he received a
total of $10,000 from Bin Ladin for 9/11-related expenses. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 5, 2004.

52. For Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi's travels, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 30, 2003.

Khallad has provided a second version, namely that all three traveled together to Karachi. Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Hazmi and Atta's simultaneous presence in Quetta, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Mar. 31, 2004. KSM maintains it was a coincidence. Ibid.

53. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 31, 2004. In his initial post-capture statements, KSM claimed

that Mihdhar did not have to attend the training because he had previously received similar training from KSM.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. KSM subsequently expressed uncertainty about why Bin
Ladin and Atef excused Mihdhar from the training. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.

54. For the varying accounts of the course's length, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18,

2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003; July 31, 2003. For KSM's descrip-
tion, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004. For Khallad's
description, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004. KSM says that he permitted the trainees
to view Hollywood films about hijackings only after he edited the films to cover the female characters. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003. For the use of game software and discussions of casing flights, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003. For KSM's instructions regarding casing, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For visits to travel agencies, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad, Aug. 13, 2003.

55. For the travels of Khallad,Abu Bara, and Hazmi via Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,

Aug. 18, 2003. For Mihdhar's travel from Yemen, see FBI report,"Hijackers Timeline," Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-
NY-280350, serial 24808).

56. For the operatives' knowledge, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For Hazmi and

Mihdhar being sent to Malaysia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003. For passport doctor-
ing, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For casing, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, July 29, 2003. For Khallad and Abu Bara's departure, as well as Hazmi's travel, see Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. Khallad maintains that Abu Bara did not participate in the casing operation and
simply traveled to Kuala Lumpur as Khallad's companion. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30,
2003.

57. For the trip's original purpose and Bin Ladin's suggestion, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khal-

lad, July 31, 2003. On Malaysia, Endolite, and the financing of Khallad's trip, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003.

58. On informing Hambali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Hambali's assis-

tance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali,
Sept. 4, 2003. For the colleague who spoke Arabic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003.

59. For the dates of Khallad's travel, his mistake in seating, and his other efforts to case flights, see Intelligence

reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Aug. 21, 2003. Khallad says he put the box cutter alongside tubes

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