rogations of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002; Dec. 26, 2002.
smuggling and embassy-bombing plots, see Intelligence report, seizure of antitank missiles in Saudi Arabia, June 14,
1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al Owahli, Sept. 9, 1998, p. 6.
rogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002.The reporting of Nashiri's statements on this subject is somewhat inconsistent,
especially as to the exact timing of the original proposal. Some corroboration does exist, however, for Nashiri's
claim that the original proposal was his. A detainee says that 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar told him about the
maritime operation sometime in late 1999 and credited Nashiri as its originator. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Dec. 2, 2001.
he would have an al Qaeda member travel to Pakistan to summon Nashiri by telephone. Ibid.
ing to one of his mujahideen colleagues, so extreme in his ferocity in waging jihad that he "would commit a ter-
rorist act `in Mecca inside the Ka'aba itself ' [the holiest site in Islam] if he believed there was a need to do so"). On
Nashiri's role on the Arabian Peninsula, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 14, 2004. Nashiri also
enjoyed a reputation as a productive recruiter for al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubay-
dah, Aug. 29, 2002. On Nashiri's discretion, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 20, 2002.
On Nashiri seeking Bin Ladin's approval, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 14, 2004. On the Lim-
burg operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, May 21, 2003. On Nashiri's security concerns, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 20, 2003.
33. For KSM's learning from the first World Trade Center bombing and his interest in a more novel form of
speculation about striking the World Trade Center and CIA, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19,
2004. KSM has stated that he and Yousef at this time never advanced the notion of using aircraft as weapons past
the idea stage. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004.
attacking targets, including the World Trade Center, with hijacked commercial airliners flown by U.S.-trained Mid-
dle Eastern pilots. See Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI--the Untold Story
(HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 278280. In Murad's initial taped confession, he referred to an idea of crashing a plane
into CIA headquarters. Lance gave us his copy of an apparent 1995 Philippine National Police document on an
interrogation of Murad.That document reports Murad describing his idea of crashing a plane into CIA headquar-
ters, but in this report Murad claims he was thinking of hijacking a commercial aircraft to do it, saying the idea had
come up in a casual conversation with Yousef with no specific plan for its execution. We have seen no pre-9/11
evidence that Murad referred in interrogations to the training of other pilots, or referred in this casual conversa-
tion to targets other than the CIA. According to Lance, the Philippine police officer, who after 9/11 offered the
much more elaborate account of Murad's statements reported in Lance's book, claims to have passed this added
information to U.S. officials. But Lance states the Philippine officer declined to identify these officials. Peter Lance
interview (Mar. 15, 2004). If such information was provided to a U.S. official, we have seen no indication that it
was written down or disseminated within the U.S. government. Incidentally, KSM says he never discussed his idea
for the planes operation with Murad, a person KSM regarded as a minor figure. Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004.
35. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Nov. 6, 2003.Abu Zubaydah, who worked closely
the 9/11 plan, and that Bin Ladin urged KSM to expand the operation with the comment, "Why do you use an
axe when you can use a bulldozer?" Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 16, 2003.The only
possible corroboration we have found for Abu Zubaydah's statement is Khallad's suggestion that Bin Ladin may
have expanded KSM's original idea for an attack using planes. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 22,
2004. Neither Abu Zubaydah nor Khallad claims to have been present when KSM says he first pitched his proposal
to Bin Ladin in 1996.