including associates of co-conspirator Wali Khan and KSM's own funds. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,
Nov. 26, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004. On activities during the summer of 1994, see Intelligence reports, inter-
rogations of KSM, May 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; Nov. 10, 2003; Feb. 21, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004.
Khan from Afghanistan). On the testing of the timer, see Brief for the United States of America, United States v.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, No. 98-1041(L) (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000), pp. 8586, 8891.The latter explosion caused
the death of a passenger and extensive damage to the aircraft, which was forced to make an emergency landing in
Okinawa. In 1996,Yousef was convicted on charges arising out of the Bojinka plot, including the bombing of the
Philippine Airlines flight. See ibid., p. 8. On KSM's travels, see generally Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 12, 2003.Yousef managed to escape to Pakistan, but his accomplice, Murad--whom KSM claims to have sent
to Yousef with $3,000 to help fund the operation--was arrested and disclosed details of the plot while under inter-
rogation. Contrary to Murad's confession, in which he described his intended role as one of the five operatives who
would plant bombs on board the targeted aircraft, KSM has said that Murad's role was limited to carrying the $3,000
from Dubai to Manila. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004; (two reports); Feb. 24, 2004;Apr.
2, 2004.This aspect of KSM's account is not credible, as it conflicts not just with Murad's confession but also with
physical evidence tying Murad to the very core of the plot, and with KSM's own statements elsewhere that Murad
was involved in planning and executing the operation. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003;
Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004 (in which KSM also claims that while he was in Qatar in February 1995, he and Yousef
consulted by telephone regarding the cargo carrier plan, and Yousef proceeded with the operation despite KSM's
advice that he hide instead).We have uncovered no evidence that KSM was present at the guesthouse in Islamabad
where Yousef 's arrest took place, as has been suggested in the press.
ufactured by KSM and Yousef in the Philippines for the Manila air operation. FBI report, Manila air investigation,
May 23, 1999. On the Sudanese trip and Afghanistan, see Intelligence report, interrogation of SM, July 12, 2003
(in which KSM also claims to have encountered Sayf al Adl while in Yemen; apparently KSM has not divulged the
substance of this meeting).
notes that Yousef was not a member of al Qaeda and that Yousef never met Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interro-
gation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
expressed interest in changing the operation so that it would involve a suicide operative. Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003.
13. Probably inflating his own role, KSM says he and a small group of colleagues, including Yousef and Wali
the other jihadist leaders concentrated on overthrowing Arab regimes and argued for limiting confrontation with
the United States to places like Somalia. On KSM's description of Bin Ladin's agenda, see Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. As discussed in chapter 2, we do not agree with this assessment. On Bin Ladin's
reactions to KSM's proposal, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19,
2004. On KSM's intent to target the United States and Bin Ladin's interest in Somalia, see Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003.
gence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003. Although KSM says he would have accepted the support of
another organization to stage a 9/11-type operation, there is no evidence he ever peddled this idea to any other
group. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. On his travels after meeting Bin Ladin, see Intel-
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. Hambali also was one of the founders of Konsojaya, a Malaysian
company run by a close associate of Wali Khan. FBI report, Manila air investigation, May 23, 1999. Hambali claims
he was asked to serve on the company's board of directors as a formality and insists that he did not recognize the
"Arabs" who were to run the company or play any role in its operations. Intelligence report, interrogation of Ham-
bali, Nov. 19, 2003.
and a group headed by Abu Zubaydah. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.