Page 505

"Outline of Program to Build Pakistan Team to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieu-
tenants," July 27, 1999; CIA memo, CIA Outline of Program to Build Uzbek and other teams to Seek the Cap-
ture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieutenants, July 27, 1999; CIA briefing materials, talking points
for the DCI for the Aug. 3 Small Group meeting,Aug. 3, 1999 (Other Pakistani Involvement in Efforts to Capture
UBL; Uzbek and other programs). On the Uzbeks' readiness, see CIA briefing materials,"Executive Summary for
UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999.

191. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999. For its preface, the

Plan quoted a memo Tenet had sent to the CIA's senior management in December 1998: "We are at war with
Usama bin Ladin."

192. Ibid. See also the following briefings of the Plan: CIA briefing materials, CTC/NSC Briefing on the Plan,

Sept. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999;
CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 2/3, 1999.

193.This figure increased through the fall of 1999, from less than 5 percent on September 16 to less than 10

percent by November 30, and finally to less than 15 percent by early December. CIA briefing materials, "Execu-
tive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Confer-
ence, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec.
2/3, 1999. On Massoud, see also CIA briefing materials,"DDCI UBL Update," Oct. 29, 1999; CIA briefing mate-
rials,"DCI UBL Update," Nov. 12, 1999.

194. CIA briefing materials, "Executive Summary for UBL Conference," Sept. 16, 1999. For the JSOC esti-

mate, see CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999.

5 Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

1.Though KSM and Bin Ladin knew each other from the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s, KSM apparently

did not begin working with al Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. Intelligence reports, inter-
rogations of KSM, Nov. 21, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004.

2.Those detainees are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Ham-

bali), Abd al Rahim al Nashiri,Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as Khallad), Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed al Kah-
tani,Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani,Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi (also known as Abu Bakr al Azdi),
and Hassan Ghul.

3. On KSM's relationship to Yousef and his ethnicity, see CIA analytic report, Khalid Sheik Muhammad's

Nephews, CTC 2003-300013, Jan. 31, 2003. On KSM's biography, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication, requests for information on KSM colleges/universities, June 10, 2002.

4. In an uncorroborated post-capture claim that may be mere bravado, KSM has stated that he considered assas-

sinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane lectured in Greensboro at some point between 1984 and 1986. Intel-
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On KSM's connection to Sayyaf, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication,"Summary of Information . . .
with regard to . . . KSM," July 8, 1999. On KSM's battle experience and his electronics work, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003. On KSM's anti-Soviet activities, see Intelligence report, inter-
rogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM says he apparently met Bin Ladin for the first time when the Sayyaf
group and Bin Ladin's Arab mujahideen group were next to each other along the front line).

5. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also notes that his group contin-

ued fighting in the Jalalabad area, and his brother Abid was killed there). KSM claims that Ramzi Yousef visited the
NGO's establishment in Jalalabad while Yousef was undergoing training. KSM adds that between 1993 and 1996,
he traveled to China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bosnia (a second time), Brazil, Sudan, and Malaysia. Most, if not all,
of this travel appears to have been related to his abiding interest in carrying out terrorist operations.Although KSM
claims that Sheikh Abdallah was not a member, financier, or supporter of al Qaeda, he admits that Abdallah under-
wrote a 1995 trip KSM took to join the Bosnia jihad. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.

6. On KSM's learning of Yousef 's plans, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004 (in which

KSM also contends that Yousef never divulged to him the intended target of the attack). On KSM/Yousef phone
conversations, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM also says that most of
his phone conversations with Yousef were social in nature, but that Yousef did discuss mixing explosives ingredients
once or twice and that on one occasion,Yousef asked him to send the passport Yousef had in his true name,Abdul
Basit). On KSM's money transfer, see FBI report,Tradebom investigation, Mar. 20, 1993.

7. Evidence gathered at the time of Yousef 's February 1995 arrest included dolls wearing clothes containing

nitrocellulose. FBI evidence, Manila air investigation. On KSM's rationale for attacking the United States, see Intel-
ligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003 (in this regard, KSM's statements echo those of Yousef, who
delivered an extensive polemic against U.S. foreign policy at his January 1998 sentencing). On the Manila air plot,
see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003; July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says bojinka is not
Serbo-Croatian for "big bang," as has been widely reported, but rather a nonsense word he adopted after hearing

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