133. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Jan. 12, 1999.
134. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, Feb. 10, 1999; Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).
135. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Feb. 11, 1999.The email in fact misspells "boogie" as "boggie."
136. NSC email, Riedel to NSC front office, Feb. 16, 1999.The email does not provide Riedel's source. For
138. DOS cable,Washington 157093,"Aug. 21 telephone conversation between POTUS and Prime Minister
140. Ibid.
141. DOD memo, Headquarters SOC, "Planning Directive for Infinite Resolve," Dec. 23, 1998. On basing
(Feb. 19, 2004).
144. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
145. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004);William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
146. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004);William Boykin interview (Nov. 7, 2003).
147. General Zinni reminded us that in addition to severing military-to-military relations with Pakistan after
test. Instead, the United States kept the money Pakistan paid for the F-16s to fund storage of the aircraft. Mean-
while, Pakistani pilots were crashing and dying."Guess how they [felt] about the United States of America," Zinni
said. Nevertheless, Zinni told us that Musharraf was someone who would actually work with the United States if
he was given the chance to do so. Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
149. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
150.William Cohen testimony (Mar. 23, 2004).
151. CIA report,"UBL Situation Report," Feb. 2, 1999. Public sources include Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 447449;
153. DOD order, MOD 001 to CJCS warning order, Feb. 8, 1999.
154. CIA reports,"UBL Situation Report," Feb. 610, 1999.
155. CIA cable,"Support for Military Contingency Planning," Feb. 10, 1999.
156. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, Feb. 10, 1999.
157. CIA talking points,"CIA Operations Against UBL," Feb. 10, 1999.
158. CIA reports,"UBL Situation Reports," Feb. 1112, 1999.
159. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Gary Schroen inter-
161. NSC memo, Clarke, secure teleconference between UAE Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid and Clarke,
agreement to buy F-16 aircraft from the United States. His visit included one-on-one meetings with Army Chief of
Staff bin Zayid, as well as talks with Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, the ruler of Dubai. Both agreed to try to work
with the United States in their efforts against Bin Ladin. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,Trip Report, Feb. 8, 1999;
Theodore Kattouf interview (Apr.21,2004).On February 10,as the United States considered striking the camp,Clarke
reported that during his visit bin Zayid had vehemently denied rumors that high-level UAE officials were in
Afghanistan. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick, UBL update, Feb. 10, 1999. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that
high-level UAE officials had indeed been at the desert camp. CIA memo, "Recent High Level UAE Visits to
Afghanistan," Feb. 19, 1999. General Shelton also told us that his UAE counterpart said he had been hunting at a desert
camp in Afghanistan at about this time. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
network's major subsources (within Bin Ladin's Taliban security detail) was dispatched to the north, further hand-
icapping reporting efforts. CIA talking points, "Locating Bin Ladin," Mar. 29, 1999.