Simon to Berger,"Talking Points for Lott-Gingrich Meeting," Sept. 24, 1998.
69. NSC memo, Wechsler, summary of conclusions of Nov. 16, 1998, meeting of Working Group on UBL's
Finances.
70. Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control to DOS,"Draft
Cable on Meeting with Two of UBL's Brothers," May 19, 2000; DOS cable, State 035243,"January 2000 Meeting
Regarding UBL Finances," Feb. 27, 2000; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004).The U.S. government team learned
that the Bin Ladin family sold UBL's share of the inheritance and, at the direction of the Saudi government, placed
the money into a specified account then frozen by the Saudi government in 1994.
71. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. According to Clarke,Tenet's deputy, John Gordon,
agreed that there was no senior CIA manager to answer these questions and promised to fix that.
72. DOS memo, McKune to Albright,"State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Pakistan," Feb. 1998. For the rejection
of the proposed designation, see handwritten notes on the McKune memo.
73. Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
74. NSC memo, Simon to NSC officials, Oct. 6, 1998. Links between Pakistan's military intelligence service
and Harakat ul Ansar trainees at Bin Ladin camps near Khowst were also discussed in DOS memo, Inderfurth to
Talbott,"Pakistani Links to Kashmiri Militants," Aug. 23, 1998.
75.William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
76. By the fall of 1999, the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington amendments prohibited most economic and mili-
tary assistance to Pakistan. Clinton administration officials told us that these sanctions made it impossible to offer
"carrots" to Pakistan, and that before 9/11, waiving sanctions was not feasible because of the Musharraf coup, non-
proliferation concerns, and Congress's pro-India orientation. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Strobe Tal-
bott interview (Feb. 8, 2004).
77. Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004). Berger agreed with Talbott that using other sticks, such as block-
ing loans from international financial institutions, would have risked a collapse of the Pakistani government and
the rise of Islamists to power in a nuclear-armed country. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
78. DOS memo, Pickering to Albright,"Berger meeting on UBL," Nov. 3, 1998.
79.White House reports made available to the Commission. President Clinton met with Prime Minister Sharif
on December 2, 1999, and called him on December 18, 1999.
80. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 9, 1998.The event described in the intelligence report was said to have
occurred on November 17, 1998. Intelligence officials now tell us that there are some doubts about the accuracy
of the report.
81. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). For Sheehan's background, see Madeleine Albright, with Bill
Woodward, Madam Secretary (Miramax, 2003), pp. 369370. For one of Sheehan's warnings, see DOS cable, Abu
Dhabi 002212,"Messages for the Taliban," Apr. 9, 1999.
82. Michael Sheehan interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; March 2004). For Albright's views, see Madeleine Albright
interview (Jan. 7, 2004). NSC memo, Principals' Decision Paper, Mar. 8, 1999. In May 1999, Albright approved a
State Department diplomatic strategy calling for increased high-level pressure on the Taliban and the three coun-
tries that recognized it--and for unilateral sanctions if this failed. DOS memo, Inderfurth, Indyk, and Sheehan to
Albright,"A New Bin Ladin Strategy," May 15, 1999.
83. NSC email, Riedel to Berger and Clarke, June 8, 1999.
84. See Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; Michael
Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). Although Sheehan told us he was initially skeptical about supporting the North-
ern Alliance, he eventually came around in the fall of 2000.
85. For aid to the exile groups, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Peter Tomsen interview (July 14,
2004).The aid was later cut because of alleged accounting deficiencies. For the diplomat's views, see Christina Rocca
interview (Jan. 29, 2004). But Peter Tomsen, the State Department's special envoy to the Afghan resistance in the
late 1980s, believed that neither administration did enough to assemble an anti-Taliban ruling coalition inside and
outside Afghanistan. Peter Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003); see also letter from Peter Tomsen to the Commission,
June 30, 2004.
86. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, May 18, 1999.
87. DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; DOS memo, Oakley to Pickering,"Designating the Tal-
iban a FTO," Apr. 22, 1999; Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999. Since 1979, the secretary of state has had the
authority to name "state sponsors of terrorism," subjecting such countries to significant economic sanctions. Being
designated a "foreign terrorist organization" also brings sanctions and stigmatizes a regime.While the U.S. govern-
ment did not use either designation against the Taliban, the sanctions under this executive order mimicked the sanc-
tions that would have been implemented under them.
88. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267, Oct. 15, 1999. UNSCR 1267 demanded that the Tal-
iban render Bin Ladin to justice within 30 days; upon noncompliance, UN member states were called on to restrict
takeoff and landing rights of Taliban-owned aircraft.The sanctions also required member states to freeze Taliban
funds and financial resources. But Taliban "charter flights" continued to fly between Afghanistan and the UAE.
Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, "Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda Funds Flowed," Los Angeles
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