cial attention on domestic preparedness and response to terrorist attack.Though the intelligence oversight panels'
work was largely secret, the intelligence community's annual worldwide threat testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence was public testimony (typically followed by a closed session). From 1997 through 2001,
the threat of terrorism rose on the priority list from third (19971998) to second (19992000) to first in 2001. See
Commission analysis of congressional hearings on terrorism.
warnings about possible domestic terrorist attacks and recommended a new institution devoted to identifying and
defending vulnerabilities in homeland security. See Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Secu-
rity/21st Century,"Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," Feb. 15, 2001. A second, chaired by
former governor James G. Gilmore of Virginia, studied domestic preparedness to cope with attacks using weapons
of mass destruction and presented five reports. See, e.g., Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of
the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion,"Forging America's New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty," Dec. 15, 2003.The third,
chaired by L. Paul Bremer, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator, with vice chair Maurice
Sonnenberg, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, focused specifically on terrorist
threats and what could be done to prepare for them. See Report of the National Commission on Terrorism,"Coun-
tering the Threat of International Terrorism," June 2000.
Ladin and composition of its Sudanese wing, July 22, 1993. On aid to Yemeni terrorists, see DOS memo, attached
to Bin Ladin "Viper" file,Aug. 28, 1993. CTC documents describing Bin Ladin as an "extremist financier" include
Intelligence report, Bin Ladin links to materials related to WMD, Mar. 20, 1997; Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's
financial support to Egyptian, Algerian, and Libyan extremists, June 17, 1997.
2001, out of about 390 CTC employees. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA response to Commission ques-
tions for the record, Jan. 21, 2004.
roles and responsibilities of the organizational component (Dec. 19, 1996); on objectives and direction (Jan. 8, 1997;
Jan. 27, 1997); on the financial infrastructure and networks (Dec. 30, 1996; Jan. 3, 1997); on connections and col-
laboration with other terrorist groups and supporters (Jan 8, 1997; Jan. 31, 1997; Jan 31, 1997; Feb. 7, 1997); on
activities in Somalia (Apr. 30, 1997); on Bin Ladin's efforts to acquire WMD materials (Mar. 18, 1997). On the other
walk-in source, see CIA cable, Jan. 3, 1997. Material from the Nairobi cell was introduced into evidence during the
testimony of FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.),
Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 10781088, 10961102).
5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 269270; Mike inter-
view (Dec. 4, 2003).
tions and the lack of a U.S. indictment, see Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003). On the indictment issue and
the supposed Sudanese offer to give up Bin Ladin, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
about Bin Ladin at the time. But it did not lead to plans for a U.S. operation to snatch Bin Ladin, because there
was no indictment against him. Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004). It appears, how-
ever, that if another country had been willing to imprison Bin Ladin, the CIA might have tried to work out a sce-
nario for apprehending him. CIA cable, May 8, 1996.The Sudanese government did not notify the United States
that Bin Ladin had left the country until about two days after his departure. DOS cable, Nairobi 07020, "Sudan:
Foreign Minister on Developments," May 21, 1996.