him of any information that she felt merited his attention. Belger in turn would determine whether the informa-
tion needed to be raised with Administrator Garvey. Garvey told us that she maintained an open door policy and
counted on her security staff to keep her informed on any pressing issues. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003);
Monte Belger interview (Nov. 24, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30,
2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). Regarding the intelligence unit, see Nicholas Grant interview
(May 26, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003); Alexander T.
Wells, Commercial Aviation Safety (McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 308.
27, 1997.The profile was derived from information on the Passenger Name Record and did not include factors
such as race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to those chosen by the algorithm, a number of other pas-
sengers were selected at random, both to address concerns about discrimination and to deter terrorists from figur-
ing out the algorithm and gaming the system. On no-fly lists, see FAA security directive, "Threat to U.S. Air
Carriers," SD 95, Apr. 24, 2000. Some of the individuals on the no-fly list were in U.S. custody as of 9/11. See
Kevin G. Hall,Alfonso Chardy, and Juan O.Tamayo,"Mix-Up Almost Permitted Deportation of Men Suspected of
Terrorist Activities," Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 2001; FAA security directive, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators," SD
108-1, Aug. 28, 2001. On the Gore Commission, see Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security, Feb. 12, 1997, p. 28. On the TIPOFF database (used to screen visa applicants and persons seeking per-
mission to enter the United States against the names of known or suspected terrorists), see DOS cable, State 182167,
"Fighting Terrorism:Visas Viper Procedures," Oct. 19, 2001. Finally, on the watchlist, officials told us that large lists
were difficult to implement, particularly when they weren't accompanied by numeric data such as date of birth that
would enable an air carrier to distinguish the terrorist from others around the world who had his or her name. In
addition, the U.S. intelligence community was required to approve the "no-fly" listing of an individual in order to
protect sources and methods. Matt Kormann interview (Feb. 13, 2004).
SD 97-01 Oct. 27, 1997. Under the previous noncomputerized profiling system, selectees were subject to second-
ary screening of their carry-on belongings, and checked baggage. See FAA security directive,"Threat to Air Car-
riers," SD 96-05, Aug. 19, 1996.
reasonable person to be a `menacing knife' and/or may be illegal under local law and should not be allowed to enter
the sterile area." See FAA regulations,Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide,Aug. 1999; see also Air Transport
Association Regional Airlines Association report,"Checkpoint Operations Guide,"Aug. 1999; Cathal Flynn inter-
view (Sept. 9, 2003); Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). A 1994 FAA
assessment of the threat to civil aviation in the United States stated that "system vulnerabilities also exist with respect
to hijackings . . . aircraft can be hijacked with either fake weapons or hoax explosive devices. Cabin crew or pas-
sengers can also be threatened with objects such as short blade knives, which are allowable on board aircraft." See
FAA report,"The Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation in the United States," Sept. 1994.
Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; FAA records, Intelligence Case File 9896.
Soliday. Bruce Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Steven Jenkins inter-
view (Feb. 24, 2004).
(2001); FAA regulations,"Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door," 14 C.F.R. § 121.587 (2001). Also
compromising cockpit security was the use of common locks (one key fit the cockpits of all Boeing aircraft) and
the absence of procedures to properly manage and safeguard cockpit keys. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,
2004). For the quote on reinforced cockpit doors, see Byron Okada,"Air Rage Prompts Call for Safety Measures:
The FAA Is Expected to Release a Report Today," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1.