FISC; others, less formally recorded, were believed by the FBI to be equally applicable.
see Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On OIPR's stated defense,
see David Kris interview (May 19, 2004); Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004). On OIPR's threat, see Larry
Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Thomas A. interview (Mar. 16, 2004). On the lack of information flow, see
Bellows Report, pp. 722, 724725, 729731.
Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003. On incorrect interpretation by field agents, see Joint
Inquiry report, pp. 363, 367368; Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004);
DOJ Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4,
2002.
Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002.These barriers were reinforced by caveats NSA began placing
on all of its Bin Ladinrelated reports and later on all of its counterterrorism-related reports--whether or not the
information was subject to the attorney general's order--which required approval before the report's contents could
be shared with criminal investigators. Ibid. On the several reviews of the process, see Bellows Report, pp. 709, 722;
DOJ Inspector General report,"The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department's
Campaign Finance Investigation," July 1999, pp. 1516, 255, 256, 328330, 340, 344; GAO report, "FBI Intelli-
gence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited," July 2001,
pp. 35.
ing OIPR's permission.These caveats were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Reno and applied
solely to reports of information gathered from three specific surveillances she had authorized. Because NSA decided
it was administratively too difficult to determine whether particular reports derived from the specific surveillances
authorized by the attorney general, NSA decided to place this caveat on all its terrorism-related reports. In Novem-
ber 2000, in response to direction from the FISA Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that consent for
sharing the information with prosecutors or criminal agents be obtained from NSA's Customer Needs and Deliv-
ery Services group. See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E.O. 12333 authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda
operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email,William L. to Brian C.,"dissemination of terrorism reporting," Dec. 29, 1999;
NSA memo,Ann D. to others,"Reporting Guidance," Dec. 30. 1999; Intelligence report, Nov. 6, 2000. See also dis-
cussion of the history of the NSA caveats in the notes to Chapter 8.
Bednarz prepared statement, Oct. 9, 2003, p. 5. On the INS's main challenges, see, e.g., Eric Holder interview (Jan.
28, 2004); Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the White House
views, see, e.g.,White House press release,"Fact Sheet on Immigration Enforcement Act," May 3, 1995. On DOJ's
concerns, see INS newsletter, Remarks of Attorney General Reno on Oct. 24, 2000, Jan. 2001, pp. 16, 26.To assess
congressional views, we reviewed all conference and committee reports relating to congressional action on INS
budget requests for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 and all Senate and House immigration hearings from 1993 to
2001. On outdated technology, see Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25,
2003).
rorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade Center" before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism,
and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 145.
(Oct. 9, 2003); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004).
Bednarz and Hurst,"Draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy Outline,"Aug. 11, 1995. On the 1997 plan, see INS email,
Cadman to others,"EAC briefing document," Dec. 5, 1997 (attachment titled "Counterterrorism/National Secu-