Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin's
Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. Bin
Ladin told his operatives he wanted them to study Hezbollah's 1983 truck bombing of U.S. marines in Lebanon
that killed 241 and led to the American pullout from Lebanon. See, e.g., statement of Ali Mohamed in support of
change of plea, United States v.Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 30); trial
testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 292293); FBI report of investigation, inter-
view of Fadl, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
86. Hugh Davies,"Saudis Detain Member of Anti-American Terror Group," Daily Telegraph (London), Aug. 2,
1997.
87. For general information on Hage, see Oriana Gill, "Hunting Bin Laden: A Portrait of Wadih El Hage,
Accused Terrorist," PBS Frontline broadcast, Sept. 12, 2001. On returning to the United States, Hage was met at the
airport by FBI agents, interrogated, and called the next day before the federal grand jury then investigating Bin
Ladin. Because he lied to the grand jury about his association with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, he was arrested imme-
diately after the embassy bombings a year later.Testimony of Patrick Fitzgerald before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 34. On Hage's phone taps, see introduction of stipulation (government exhibit no. 36),
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 27, 2001 (transcript pp. 15751576). For Harun's fax, see government exhibit no.
300A-T, United States v. bin Laden.
88."World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad," Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998; closing statement by Asst.
U.S.Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 53765377). On related activ-
ities in Kenya and Tanzania, see FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 1528,
1998.
89. FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh,Aug. 1528, 1998; closing statement by
Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5239, 5408, 5417).
90. For the Atef fax, see government exhibit no. 1636-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the fatwa, see govern-
ment exhibit no. 1602-T, United States v. bin Laden (translation of "Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a Fatwa calling
for the Removal of American Forces from the Gulf," Al Quds al Arabi, May 14, 1998). For the interview, see ABC
News interview,"To Terror's Source," May 28, 1998.
91. See closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript
pp. 54265439); see also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al `Owhali, Aug.
2225, 1998, p. 9. Copies of the declarations issued by "The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places"
taking credit for the operation were recovered from a raid in Baku, Azerbaijan, after the bombings in September
1998. See also government exhibit no. 1557C-T, United States v. bin Laden ("The formation of the Islamic Army
for the Liberation of the Holy Places"); government exhibit no. 1557D-T, United States v. bin Laden ("Al-Aqsa
Mosque operation"); government exhibit no. 1557E-T, United States v. bin Laden ("The Holy Ka'ba operation").
92. Closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript p.
5445).
93. ABC News interview, "Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden," Dec. 22, 1998 (conducted
in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai).
3 Counterterrorism Evolves
1. Brief of the United States, United States v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Lead No. 98-1041 (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000),
pp. 4243; John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and
CIA Failed to Stop It (Hyperion, 2002), pp. 95, 99.
2. On President Clinton's tasking the NSC, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). On the role of dif-
ferent U.S. government agencies, see Steve Coll, Ghost War:The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan, and bin Laden,
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 251.
3.Trial testimony of Brian Parr, United States v.Yousef, No. S12 93 CR 180 (KTD) (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 22, 1997
(transcript p. 4694).
4. On the process of identification, see Joseph Malone interview (May 25, 2004).
5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107108 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 104105, 107,
109. Abouhalima had fled to the Middle East after the bombing, and was picked up by Egyptian authorities and
returned to the United States in late March 1993. Brief of the United States, United States v. Mohammed A. Salameh,
Lead No. 94-1312 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 17, 1997), p. 64 and n. ***.
6. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107108, n. 2; United States v.Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 7879 (2d Cir. 2003);
Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 119; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,
2002), p. 12.
7. On Rahman's ties to the Farouq mosque, see Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 5455. On Rahman's message,
see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999); Brief for the United States, United States v. Siddig Ibrahim
Siddig Ali, Lead No. 96-1044 (2d Cir. filed July 3, 1997), pp. 10, 15. See also DOS Inspector General report,"Review
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
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