most accounts, Bin Ladin initially viewed Azzam as a mentor, and became in effect his partner by providing finan-
cial backing for the MAK.
23. In his memoir,Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab mujahideen were financed
(even "one penny") or trained by the United States. See Zawahiri,"Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," Al Sharq
al Awsat, Dec. 2, 2001. CIA officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regard Bin Ladin and his "Arab Afghans"
as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little to do with him. Gary Schroen interview
(Mar. 3, 2003).
24. See Abdullah Azzam,"Al Qaeda al Sulbah" (The solid foundation), Al Jihad, Apr. 1988, p. 46.
25. A wealth of information on al Qaeda's evolution and history has been obtained from materials seized in
recent years, including files labeled "Tareekh Usama" (Usama's history) and "Tareekh al Musadat" (History of the
Services Bureau). For descriptions of and substantial excerpts from these files, see Government's Evidentiary Prof-
fer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003. See also Intel-
ligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to
Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; DOD document, "Al-Qaeda," AFGP-2002-000080 (translated). For a particularly useful
insight into the evolution of al Qaeda--written by an early Bin Ladin associate, Adel Batterjee, under a pseudo-
nym--see Basil Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi Afghanistan (The Arab volunteers in Afghanistan) (Benevolence Inter-
national Foundation (BIF) and World Association of Muslim Youth, 1991).
26. Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States
v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003.
27. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Jamal al Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 23.
28. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 67, 5763, 8385;
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104105, 123124 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 1996).
29. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 2527; DOD document,"Union Agreement between Jama'at Qaedat Ansar
Allah (The Base Group of Allah Supporters) and Jama'at Al-Jihad (Jihad Group)," AFGP-2002-000081, undated;
Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 103.
30.Trial testimony of Jamal al Fadl, United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Feb. 6,
2001 (transcript pp. 218219, 233); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 514516); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript p. 890). Fadl
says this invitation was delivered by a Sudanese delegation that visited Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. See also CIA ana-
lytic report, "Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 19921996: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths," CTC 2003-
40028CHX, Mar. 10, 2003.
31. See Intelligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from
Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996.
32.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 220224).
33. For Bin Ladin's confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret
World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp. 8082. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal fam-
ily, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept.
26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996.
34. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 34.
35. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Terrorism:
Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA
analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.
36.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301302, 305306, 315317,
367368); Intelligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from
Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.
37. See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Shipment
of Arms and Boats to Yemen for Use by an Islamic Extremist,Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report,Terrorism: Respon-
sibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Old School Ties,"
Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report,
"Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa'ida's Business and Financial Links in Southeast Asia," CTC 2002-40066CH, June 6, 2002.
For Bin Ladin's involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe:The Afghan-
Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004).
38.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 354); FBI reports of investiga-
tion, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21, 1998;"RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Con-
nection," Manila Times, Apr. 26, 2002.
39.Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 354355); FBI report of inves-
tigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Par-
liament, "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Jan. 7, 2003.
40. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 100, 235.
41. See CIA analytic report, "Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists," CTC 2002-30037H, May
15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp. 129137.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
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