Page 480

190. Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). For participants, see Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003);

Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Jeff Griffith interview (Mar. 31, 2004). On the absence of Defense offi-
cials, see John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004).The White House video teleconference was not connected
into the area of the NMCC where the crisis was being managed.Thus the director of the operations team--who
was on the phone with NORAD--did not have the benefit of information being shared on the video teleconfer-
ence. See, e.g., Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Montague Winfield interview (Apr. 26, 2004); Patrick Gard-
ner interview (May 12, 2004). Moreover, when the Secretary and Vice Chairman later participated in the White
House video teleconference, they were necessarily absent from the NMCC and unable to provide guidance to the
operations team. See DOD report, OT-2 Analysis of NMCC Response to Terrorist Attack on 11 SEP 01, Oct. 4,
2001; John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004).

191. NSC notes, Paul Kurtz notes, Sept. 11, 2001; Paul Kurtz meeting (Dec. 22, 2003). For shootdown author-

ity having already been conveyed, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.

192. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). For the job of the NMCC in an emergency, see NMCC brief-

ing (July 21, 2003).

193. For the Secretary's activities, see DOD memo, interview of Donald Rumsfeld, Dec. 23, 2002; Stephen

Cambone interview (July 8, 2004).

194. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Secure teleconferences are the NMCC's primary means of coor-

dinating emergencies, and they fall into two categories:"event" and "threat." Event conferences seek to gather infor-
mation. If the situation escalates, a threat conference may be convened. On 9/11, there was no preset teleconference
for a domestic terrorist attack. NMCC and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) briefing (July 21,
2003). For the content of the conferences on 9/11, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.

195. See DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; see also White House notes, Thomas

Gould notes, Sept. 11, 2001.

196. On difficulties in including the FAA, see NMCC and NMJIC briefing (July 21, 2003); John Brunderman

interview (May 17, 2004). On NORAD and the time of the FAA's joining, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Con-
ference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA representative, see Rayford Brooks interview (Apr. 15, 2004).

197. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004); Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004).
198. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
199. On the briefing, see ibid.The Vice Chairman was on Capitol Hill when the Pentagon was struck, and he

saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004). For the Chair-
man being out of the country, see DOD record, Deputy Director for Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001.

200. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.
203. For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001.

For Card's statement, see White House transcript, Card interview with Ron Fournier, Aug. 7, 2002. For the Pres-
ident's reaction, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).

204. For the President's activities, see Education Channel videotape,"Raw Footage of President Bush at Emma

E. Booker Elementary School," Sept. 11, 2001 (remaining in classroom); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004)
(in the holding room). For his calls, see White House record, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001 (9:15 call to
Vice President); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004) (call to Rice); President Bush and Vice President Cheney
meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) (call to Pataki); White House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (call to
Mueller). For the decision to make a statement, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the Secret Service's
perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).

205. On the return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar.

31, 2004). On consulting with senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). On information about
additional aircraft, see, e.g., Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). On decisions and the focus on the President's
speech, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22,
2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004).

206. On the motorcade, see USSS record, shift log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:35, arriving 9:45); USSS record,

Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (departing 9:36, arriving 9:42). Fleischer deduced from his notes that
the President learned about the Pentagon while in the motorcade.Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the
President's actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004);White House
notes, Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001.

207. On not returning to Washington, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview

of Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001;Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For additional sources on the President's
desire to return, see White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5.
For the Vice President's recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For
time of departure, see USSS record, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001. On Air Force One's objectives
on takeoff, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

463

FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 463