background image
148. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10.
149. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 2223,
2004).
150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34.The mission commander thought to
put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a "barrier cap" between the hijack and Washington, D.C. Kevin
Nasypany interview (Jan. 2223, 2004).
151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid., 9:33:58.
152. For first quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:35:50. For second
quote, see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position,channel 7, 9:36:34; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan.
2223, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37;
Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 2223, 2004).
153. Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); FAA memo,"Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; Sep-
tember 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 24 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo,"Partial Transcript; Scramble Air-
craft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001," Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 25 (East Feeder Radar position).
154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30,
2003).The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air
traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
155. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003); NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder
1, channel 7, 9:41.
156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08.
157. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,"
May 10, 2002, p. 10.
158.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept.
17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from
an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." See FAA memo,"Full Transcript; Aircraft
Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11.
159.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept.
17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a "second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible
screaming or a struggle and a statement,`get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over
the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio." FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, "Full
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 11. At
9:31:48, ExecJet 56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call.We did hear that, uh, yelling too."
The FAA responded at 9:31:51,"Okay, thanks.We're just trying to figure out what's going on." FAA memo,"Full
Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, p. 15.
160. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,"
May 10, 2002, p. 15.
161. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage-
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command
Center, New York Center position, line 5154.
162. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,"
May 10, 2002, p. 19.
163. Ibid., p. 23.
164. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage-
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 1617; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain
Radar position; FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11,
2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 2632.
165. FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Manage-
ment Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 1719.
166. For 9:46 quotation, see ibid., pp. 1920. For 9:49 discussion about military assistance, see ibid., p. 21.
167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte Belger nor the deputy direc-
tor for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20,
2004); Peter Challan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation
occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at
9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center "Peter's talking to Monte now about scrambling."
FAA memo,"Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Offi-
cer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid.,
pp. 2427.
168. Ibid., pp. 2327.We also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on September 11, 2001, whose
authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was "10:06:055 (EDT)."Won-Young Kim and G. R. Baum,
"Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001,Terrorist Attack," spring 2002 (report to the Maryland Depart-
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
461
FinalNotes.4pp 7/17/04 4:26 PM Page 461