tor Technician position, channel 14, 8:37:15. See also interviews with Otis and NEADS personnel: Jeremy Powell
interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004),
and interviews with Otis fighter pilots: Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7,
2004). According to Joseph Cooper from Boston Center,"I coordinated with Huntress ["Huntress" is the call sign
for NEADS]. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I
supplied pertinent information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis." FAA record, Personnel Statement of
Joseph Cooper, Oct. 30, 2001.
Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004); NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:44:58; NEADS
audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 8:51:13.
nical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons direc-
tor technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.We found a single communication from the
weapons director or his technician on the Guard frequency at approximately 9:11, cautioning the Otis fighters:
"remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance." See NEADS audio file, channel 24.
That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and before they headed for New
York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters.At 9:10,
the senior director on the NEADS floor told the weapons director,"I want those fighters closer in." NEADS audio
file, Identification Technician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the
second tower had been struck. At 9:12:54, the Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed
to establish a combat air patrol over New York, and they immediately headed for New York City. See FAA audio
files, Boston Center, position 31R. This series of communications explains why the Otis fighters briefly entered
and then soon departed the holding pattern, as the radar reconstruction of their flight shows. DOD radar files, 84th
Radar Evaluation Squadron,"9/11 Autoplay," undated.
each incident.The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10
last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13
Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers,"ZJX Timeline for
N47BA accident," Feb. 17, 2004.
tion Squadron,"9/11 Autoplay," undated.The FAA-produced timeline notes,"Based on coordination received from
[Boston Center] indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention is focused on AAL 11." See FAA
report,"Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; see also David Bottiglia inter-
view (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,"
May 8, 2002, p. 9.
125. FAA memo, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8,
fic. I let you United 175 just took off out of think we might have a hijack over here.Two of them." See FAA memo,
"Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002.
Michael McCormick, Oct. 17, 2001. See also FAA memo,"Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York,
NY; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002, p. 17.