American Airlines' policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of respon-
sibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines' policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike
Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). United Airlines had no such "isolation" policy. UAL System Operations Con-
trol briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
Commission review of Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight
93 (which indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed Ballinger ACARS log, Sept. 11,
2001. At 9:22, after learning of the events at the World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot Leroy
Homer, had an ACARS message sent to her husband in the cockpit asking if he was okay. See UAL record,ACARS
message, Sept. 11, 2001.
FAA report, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traf-
fic Control Recording--United Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001.
11September 4, 2001). See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors, undated. Five passengers holding reser-
vations for Flight 93 did not show for the flight.All five were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FBI report,"Flight
#93 `No Show' Passengers from 9/11/01," Sept. 18, 2001.
74. See FAA regulations,Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. § 121.547 (2001); UAL records, copies of board-
If that number is accurate, it would include the four hijackers. FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jeffer-
son, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 11, 2001.All but one of the six passengers seated
in the first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned anyone from their
cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and expe-
rienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who
had not obtained the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93 pilots. For jumpseat infor-
mation, see UAL record,Weight and Balance Information for Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL records,
Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001.
UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003.Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United's headquarters that the flight was not responding
to radio calls.According to United, the flight's nonresponse and its turn to the east led the airline to believe by 9:36
that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, "United dispatch SMFDO
activities--terrorist crisis," Sept. 11, 2001.
This is the only recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire.The CVRs and
FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 was badly burned
and not recoverable. See FBI report,"CVR from UA Flight #93," Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 25.1457, 91.609, 91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared by
the NTSB and the FBI.
time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept.
18, 2001.
through Oct. 4, 2001.Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger at
9:24. See UAL record, Ed Ballinger's ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001.
accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to sup-
plement or verify the record. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer,
Mark Bingham, Sandy Bradshaw, Marion Britton,Thomas Burnett, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Jeremy Glick, Lau-
ren Grandcolas, Linda Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio.