background image
After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the
order at 9:23:"Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington
area. . . . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them. . . . These guys are smart."
That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24.
Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to
keep the Otis fighters over New York.The heading of the Langley fighters was
adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander
explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between
the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.
150
At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted
the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the
conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS:"We're look-
ing--we also lost American 77." The time was 9:34.
151
This was the first notice
to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If
NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have
received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although
the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for
military assistance with American 77.
At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery
about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:"Latest report.Aircraft
VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, south-
west. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news
prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control
of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:"Okay, we're going
to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discov-
ered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward
the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean."I don't care how many
windows you break," he said."Damn it. . . . Okay. Push them back."
152
The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First,
unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the tar-
get or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan--prepared to get the
aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly--incorrectly led the Lang-
ley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.Third,
the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan
instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order.
153
After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles
from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C.
Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind
of faded" over Washington.The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck
by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.
154
Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible
hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.After
the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that
"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"
27
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 27