In chapter 6, we described the transition of 20002001. Beyond the policy
issues we described, the new administration did not have its deputy cabinet offi-
cers in place until the spring of 2001, and the critical subcabinet officials were
not confirmed until the summer--if then. In other words, the new adminis-
tration--like others before it--did not have its team on the job until at least
six months after it took office.
tle or no notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disrup-
tion of national security policymaking during the change of
administrations by accelerating the process for national security
appointments. We think the process could be improved significantly
so transitions can work more effectively and allow new officials to
assume their new responsibilities as quickly as possible.
necessary, those team members can obtain security clearances imme-
diately after the election is over.
immediately after the election, so that their background investigations
can be complete before January 20.
uniform security questionnaires and financial report requirements, and
maintaining a single database.This agency can also be responsible for
administering polygraph tests on behalf of organizations that require
them.
net departments, not later than January 20. The Senate, in return,
should adopt special rules requiring hearings and votes to confirm or
reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission.
The Senate should not require confirmation of such executive
appointees below Executive Level 3.
list that catalogues specific, operational threats to national security;
major military or covert operations; and pending decisions on the pos-