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mission center to oversee these details, helping to coordinate closely
with the White House.The CIA will be able to concentrate on build-
ing the capabilities to carry out such operations and on providing the
personnel who will be directing and executing such operations in the
field.
· Rebuilding the analytic and human intelligence collection capabili-
ties of the CIA should be a full-time effort, and the director of the
CIA should focus on extending its comparative advantages.
Recommendation: The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuild-
ing the CIA's analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine
service by building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing
a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient
financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity
among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign
cities; (e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source col-
lection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) stress-
ing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations.
The CIA should retain responsibility for the direction and execution of clan-
destine and covert operations, as assigned by the relevant national intelligence
center and authorized by the National Intelligence Director and the president.
This would include propaganda, renditions, and nonmilitary disruption. We
believe, however, that one important area of responsibility should change.
Recommendation: Lead responsibility for directing and executing
paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift
to the Defense Department.There it should be consolidated with the
capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations
already being developed in the Special Operations Command.
· Before 9/11, the CIA did not invest in developing a robust capability
to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel. It relied on
proxies instead, organized by CIA operatives without the requisite
military training.The results were unsatisfactory.
· Whether the price is measured in either money or people, the United
States cannot afford to build two separate capabilities for carrying out
secret military operations, secretly operating standoff missiles, and
secretly training foreign military or paramilitary forces. The United
States should concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authori-
ties in one entity.
HOW TO DO IT?
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