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transformed, its collective mind-set moved from service-specific to
"joint," and its operations became more integrated.

· Lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide.The

leadership of the intelligence community should be able to pool infor-
mation gathered overseas with information gathered in the United
States, holding the work--wherever it is done--to a common stan-
dard of quality in how it is collected, processed (e.g., translated),
reported, shared, and analyzed. A common set of personnel standards
for intelligence can create a group of professionals better able to oper-
ate in joint activities, transcending their own service-specific mind-sets.

· Divided management of national intelligence capabilities. While the CIA

was once "central" to our national intelligence capabilities, following
the end of the Cold War it has been less able to influence the use of
the nation's imagery and signals intelligence capabilities in three
national agencies housed within the Department of Defense: the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. One of the lessons
learned from the 1991 Gulf War was the value of national intelligence
systems (satellites in particular) in precision warfare. Since that war,
the department has appropriately drawn these agencies into its trans-
formation of the military. Helping to orchestrate this transformation
is the under secretary of defense for intelligence, a position established
by Congress after 9/11. An unintended consequence of these devel-
opments has been the far greater demand made by Defense on tech-
nical systems, leaving the DCI less able to influence how these
technical resources are allocated and used.

· Weak capacity to set priorities and move resources.The agencies are mainly

organized around what they collect or the way they collect it. But the
priorities for collection are national. As the DCI makes hard choices
about moving resources, he or she must have the power to reach across
agencies and reallocate effort.

· Too many jobs.The DCI now has at least three jobs. He is expected to

run a particular agency, the CIA. He is expected to manage the loose
confederation of agencies that is the intelligence community. He is
expected to be the analyst in chief for the government, sifting evi-
dence and directly briefing the President as his principal intelligence
adviser. No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usu-
ally what loses out is management of the intelligence community, a
difficult task even in the best case because the DCI's current author-
ities are weak.With so much to do, the DCI often has not used even
the authority he has.

HOW TO DO IT?

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