Page 417

· unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and

their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that
transcends traditional governmental boundaries;

· unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve qual-

ity and accountability; and

· strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.

13.1 UNITY OF EFFORT ACROSS THE

FOREIGN-DOMESTIC DIVIDE

Joint Action
Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has dealt with "lost
opportunities," some of which we reviewed in chapter 11.These are often char-
acterized as problems of "watchlisting," of "information sharing," or of "con-
necting the dots." In chapter 11 we explained that these labels are too narrow.
They describe the symptoms, not the disease.

In each of our examples, no one was firmly in charge of managing the case

and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government, assign
responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress, and
quickly bring obstacles up to the level where they could be resolved. Respon-
sibility and accountability were diffuse.

The agencies cooperated, some of the time. But even such cooperation as

there was is not the same thing as joint action.When agencies cooperate, one
defines the problem and seeks help with it.When they act jointly, the problem
and options for action are defined differently from the start. Individuals from
different backgrounds come together in analyzing a case and planning how to
manage it.

In our hearings we regularly asked witnesses:Who is the quarterback? The

other players are in their positions, doing their jobs. But who is calling the play
that assigns roles to help them execute as a team?

Since 9/11, those issues have not been resolved. In some ways joint work

has gotten better, and in some ways worse.The effort of fighting terrorism has
flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quan-
tity and energy. Attitudes have changed. Officials are keenly conscious of try-
ing to avoid the mistakes of 9/11. They try to share information. They
circulate--even to the President--practically every reported threat, however
dubious.

Partly because of all this effort, the challenge of coordinating it has multi-

plied. Before 9/11, the CIA was plainly the lead agency confronting al Qaeda.
The FBI played a very secondary role.The engagement of the departments of
Defense and State was more episodic.

400

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

FinalCh12_13.4pp 7/17/04 4:14 PM Page 400