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Recommendation: Improved use of "no-fly" and "automatic
selectee" lists should not be delayed while the argument about a suc-
cessor to CAPPS continues. This screening function should be per-
formed by the TSA, and it should utilize the larger set of watchlists
maintained by the federal government. Air carriers should be
required to supply the information needed to test and implement this
new system.
CAPPS is still part of the screening process, still profiling passengers, with
the consequences of selection now including personal searches of the individ-
ual and carry-on bags.The TSA is dealing with the kind of screening issues that
are being encountered by other agencies.As we mentioned earlier, these screen-
ing issues need to be elevated for high-level attention and addressed promptly
by the government. Working through these problems can help clear the way
for the TSA's screening improvements and would help many other agencies too.
The next layer is the screening checkpoint itself. As the screening system
tries to stop dangerous people, the checkpoint needs to be able to find danger-
ous items. Two reforms are needed soon: (1) screening people for explosives,
not just their carry-on bags, and (2) improving screener performance.
Recommendation: The TSA and the Congress must give priority
attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect
explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for spe-
cial screening should be screened for explosives. Further, the TSA
should conduct a human factors study, a method often used in the
private sector, to understand problems in screener performance and
set attainable objectives for individual screeners and for the check-
points where screening takes place.
Concerns also remain regarding the screening and transport of checked bags
and cargo. More attention and resources should be directed to reducing or mit-
igating the threat posed by explosives in vessels' cargo holds. The TSA should
expedite the installation of advanced (in-line) baggage-screening equipment.
Because the aviation industry will derive substantial benefits from this deploy-
ment, it should pay a fair share of the costs.The TSA should require that every
passenger aircraft carrying cargo must deploy at least one hardened container to
carry any suspect cargo. TSA also needs to intensify its efforts to identify, track,
and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo in both the aviation and
maritime sectors.
The Protection of Civil Liberties
Many of our recommendations call for the government to increase its presence
in our lives--for example, by creating standards for the issuance of forms of
WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY
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