munications, the task of tracing the money from that individual to the terrorist
group, or otherwise showing complicity, was far more difficult. It was harder
still to do so without disclosing secrets.
anisms now require waiting periods before being put into effect, eliminating
the element of surprise and thus virtually ensuring that little money is actually
frozen. Worldwide asset freezes have not been adequately enforced and have
been easily circumvented, often within weeks, by simple methods.
months, as the government learned more about how al Qaeda raises, moves,
and spends money.
remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.The govern-
ment has recognized that information about terrorist money helps
us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their
operations. Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the rela-
tively small number of financial facilitators--individuals al Qaeda
relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money--at the core of
al Qaeda's revenue stream. These efforts have worked. The death or
capture of several important facilitators has decreased the amount of
money available to al Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty
in raising and moving that money. Captures have additionally pro-
vided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle
of disruption.
extraordinary cooperation, particularly in supplying information to support
quickly developing investigations. Obvious vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial
system have been corrected.The United States has been less successful in per-
suading other countries to adopt financial regulations that would permit the
tracing of financial transactions.
macy, as governments join together to identify named individuals and groups
as terrorists.They also prevent open fundraising. Some charities that have been
identified as likely avenues for terrorist financing have seen their donations