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gence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public
diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting oth-
ers, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

Certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter ter-

rorism. Terrorists should no longer find safe haven where their organizations
can grow and flourish. America's strategy should be a coalition strategy, that
includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation.

Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much,

or more, political as it is military.The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab
and Muslim world, in all its variety.

Our strategy should also include defenses.America can be attacked in many

ways and has many vulnerabilities. No defenses are perfect. But risks must be
calculated; hard choices must be made about allocating resources. Responsi-
bilities for America's defense should be clearly defined. Planning does make a
difference, identifying where a little money might have a large effect. Defenses
also complicate the plans of attackers, increasing their risks of discovery and
failure. Finally, the nation must prepare to deal with attacks that are not
stopped.

Measuring Success
What should Americans expect from their government in the struggle against
Islamist terrorism? The goals seem unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the
world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is
probably coming; it may be terrible.

With such benchmarks, the justifications for action and spending seem lim-

itless. Goals are good.Yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives.
Agencies need to be able to measure success.

These measurements do not need to be quantitative: government cannot

measure success in the ways that private firms can. But the targets should be
specific enough so that reasonable observers--in the White House, the Con-
gress, the media, or the general public--can judge whether or not the objec-
tives have been attained.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and its

affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient,
needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything.The Ameri-
can people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of
destruction.This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness.

It should not lower them too far. Our report shows a determined and capa-

ble group of plotters.Yet the group was fragile, dependent on a few key per-
sonalities, and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people
often attracted to such causes.The enemy made mistakes--like Khalid al Mihd-
har's unauthorized departure from the United States that required him to enter
the country again in July 2001, or the selection of Zacarias Moussaoui as a par-

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