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In the period between December 1999 and early January 2000, informa-
tion about terrorism flowed widely and abundantly.The flow from the FBI was
particularly remarkable because the FBI at other times shared almost no infor-
mation. That from the intelligence community was also remarkable, because
some of it reached officials--local airport managers and local police depart-
ments--who had not seen such information before and would not see it again
before 9/11, if then. And the terrorist threat, in the United States even more
than abroad, engaged the frequent attention of high officials in the executive
branch and leaders in both houses of Congress.
Why was this so? Most obviously, it was because everyone was already on
edge with the millennium and possible computer programming glitches
("Y2K") that might obliterate records, shut down power and communication
lines, or otherwise disrupt daily life.Then, Jordanian authorities arrested 16 al
Qaeda terrorists planning a number of bombings in that country.Those in cus-
tody included two U.S. citizens. Soon after, an alert Customs agent caught
Ahmed Ressam bringing explosives across the Canadian border with the
apparent intention of blowing up Los Angeles airport. He was found to have
confederates on both sides of the border.
These were not events whispered about in highly classified intelligence
dailies or FBI interview memos.The information was in all major newspapers
and highlighted in network television news.Though the Jordanian arrests only
made page 13 of the New York Times, they were featured on every evening news-
cast. The arrest of Ressam was on front pages, and the original story and its
follow-ups dominated television news for a week. FBI field offices around the
country were swamped by calls from concerned citizens. Representatives of the
Justice Department, the FAA, local police departments, and major airports had
microphones in their faces whenever they showed themselves.
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After the millennium alert, the government relaxed. Counterterrorism
went back to being a secret preserve for segments of the FBI, the Countert-
errorist Center, and the Counterterrorism Security Group. But the experi-
ence showed that the government was capable of mobilizing itself for an alert
against terrorism.While one factor was the preexistence of widespread con-
cern about Y2K, another, at least equally important, was simply shared infor-
mation. Everyone knew not only of an abstract threat but of at least one
terrorist who had been arrested in the United States.Terrorism had a face--that
of Ahmed Ressam--and Americans from Vermont to southern California
went on the watch for his like.
In the summer of 2001, DCI Tenet, the Counterterrorist Center, and the
Counterterrorism Security Group did their utmost to sound a loud alarm, its
basis being intelligence indicating that al Qaeda planned something big. But
the millennium phenomenon was not repeated. FBI field offices apparently saw
no abnormal terrorist activity, and headquarters was not shaking them up.
Between May 2001 and September 11, there was very little in newspapers
FORESIGHT--AND HINDSIGHT
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