fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier--but it then may
be too late.
an indefinite air campaign to disable that regime's limited military capabilities
and tip the balance in Afghanistan's ongoing civil war.The United States had
warned the Taliban that they would be held accountable for further attacks by
Bin Ladin against Afghanistan's U.S. interests.The warning had been given in
1998, again in late 1999, once more in the fall of 2000, and again in the sum-
mer of 2001. Delivering it repeatedly did not make it more effective.
gon to develop a plan for a sustained air campaign against the Taliban. Clarke
developed a paper laying out a formal, specific ultimatum. But Clarke's plan
apparently did not advance to formal consideration by the Small Group of
principals.We have found no indication that the idea was briefed to the new
administration or that Clarke passed his paper to them, although the same team
of career officials spanned both administrations.
Ladin's inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the
Cole, were risk free.
Bush administrations. Each president considered or authorized covert actions,
a process that consumed considerable time--especially in the Clinton admin-
istration--and achieved little success beyond the collection of intelligence.After
the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan, naval vessels remained on sta-
tion in or near the region, prepared to fire cruise missiles. General Hugh Shel-
ton developed as many as 13 different strike options, and did not recommend
any of them. The most extended debate on counterterrorism in the Bush
administration before 9/11 had to do with missions for the unmanned Preda-
tor--whether to use it just to locate Bin Ladin or to wait until it was armed
with a missile, so that it could find him and also attack him. Looking back, we
are struck with the narrow and unimaginative menu of options for action
offered to both President Clinton and President Bush.