Ladin posed. Such an examination could have made clear to all that issues were
at stake that were much larger than the domestic politics of the moment. But
the major policy agencies of the government did not meet the threat.
agendas with countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. After 9/11 that
changed.
attack al Qaeda, working day and night, than the CIA. But there were limits to
what the CIA was able to achieve in its energetic worldwide efforts to disrupt
terrorist activities or use proxies to try to capture or kill Bin Ladin and his lieu-
tenants. As early as mid-1997, one CIA officer wrote to his supervisor: "All
we're doing is holding the ring until the cavalry gets here."
Afghanistan.
the subject of formal interagency deliberation.
strike forces, to Afghanistan itself or nearby--openly, clandestinely (secretly),
or covertly (with their connection to the United States hidden). Then the
United States would no longer have been dependent on proxies to gather
actionable intelligence. However, it would have needed to secure basing and
overflight support from neighboring countries.A significant political, military,
and intelligence effort would have been required, extending over months and
perhaps years, with associated costs and risks. Given how hard it has proved to
locate Bin Ladin even today when there are substantial ground forces in
Afghanistan, its odds of sucess are hard to calculate.We have found no indica-
tion that President Clinton was offered such an intermediate choice, or that
this option was given any more consideration than the idea of invasion.
Bush were genuinely concerned about the danger posed by al Qaeda,
approaches involving more direct intervention against the sanctuary in
Afghanistan apparently must have seemed--if they were considered at all--to
be disproportionate to the threat.