lyze the enemy that, as the twentieth century closed, was most likely to launch
a surprise attack directly against the United States.
tended to underestimate a threat that grew ever greater.The terrorism fostered
by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was different from anything the government had
faced before.The existing mechanisms for handling terrorist acts had been trial
and punishment for acts committed by individuals; sanction, reprisal, deter-
rence, or war for acts by hostile governments.The actions of al Qaeda fit nei-
ther category. Its crimes were on a scale approaching acts of war, but they were
committed by a loose, far-flung, nebulous conspiracy with no territories or cit-
izens or assets that could be readily threatened, overwhelmed, or destroyed.
Cheney, and Rice; it included the topic of al Qaeda. Pavitt recalled conveying
that Bin Ladin was one of the gravest threats to the country.
but would not stop the threat.The CIA later provided more formal assessments
to the White House reiterating that conclusion. It added that in the long term,
the only way to deal with the threat was to end al Qaeda's ability to use
Afghanistan as a sanctuary for its operations.
even if it had been accepted immediately and turned into action, would not
have prevented 9/11.
tuary. The main opportunities came after the new information the U.S. gov-
ernment received in 19961997, after the embassy bombings of August 1998,
after the discoveries of the Jordanian and Ressam plots in late 1999, and after
the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.
in chapter 4. It is worth noting that they were made by the Clinton adminis-
tration under extremely difficult domestic political circumstances. Opponents
were seeking the President's impeachment. In addition, in 199899 President
Clinton was preparing the government for possible war against Serbia, and he