ested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should con-
sider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct
was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time--not only Bin Ladin. Secretary
Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one
of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party.
in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was
concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that
in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what
the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the
case for striking Iraq during "this round" of the war on terrorism.
initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda
and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq's long-standing
involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass
destruction.
attacked.
had to be dealt with," Powell told us."And he saw this as one way of using this
event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem." Powell said that President Bush
did not give Wolfowitz's argument "much weight."
Afghanistan as the priority.
during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with
Afghanistan.
plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration even-
tually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.
ests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.
headlined "Preventing More Events," he argued that if there was even a 10 per-
cent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum pri-