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General Shelton briefed the principals on the preliminary plan for
Afghanistan that the military had put together. It drew on the Infinite Resolve
"phased campaign" plan the Pentagon had begun developing in November
2000 as an addition to the strike options it had been refining since 1998. But
Shelton added a new element--the possible significant use of ground forces--
and that is where President Bush reportedly focused his attention.
48
After hearing from his senior advisers, President Bush discussed with Rice
the contents of the directives he would issue to set all the plans into motion.
Rice prepared a paper that President Bush then considered with principals
on Monday morning, September 17. "The purpose of this meeting," he
recalled saying,"is to assign tasks for the first wave of the war against terror-
ism. It starts today."
49
In a written set of instructions slightly refined during the morning meet-
ing, President Bush charged Ashcroft, Mueller, and Tenet to develop a plan for
homeland defense. President Bush directed Secretary of State Powell to
deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban along the lines that his department had
originally proposed. The State Department was also tasked to develop a plan
to stabilize Pakistan and to be prepared to notify Russia and countries near
Afghanistan when hostilities were imminent.
50
In addition, Bush and his advisers discussed new legal authorities for covert
action in Afghanistan, including the administration's first Memorandum of
Notification on Bin Ladin. Shortly thereafter, President Bush authorized broad
new authorities for the CIA.
51
President Bush instructed Rumsfeld and Shelton to develop further the
Camp David military plan to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda if the Taliban
rejected the ultimatum. The President also tasked Rumsfeld to ensure that
robust measures to protect American military forces against terrorist attack were
implemented worldwide. Finally, he directed Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill
to craft a plan to target al Qaeda's funding and seize its assets.
52
NSC staff mem-
bers had begun leading meetings on terrorist fund-raising by September 18.
53
Also by September 18, Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts
and received offers of general aid, search-and-rescue equipment and person-
nel, and medical assistance teams.
54
On the same day, Deputy Secretary of State
Armitage was called by Mahmud Ahmed regarding a two-day visit to
Afghanistan during which the Pakistani intelligence chief had met with Mul-
lah Omar and conveyed the U.S. demands. Omar's response was "not negative
on all these points."
55
But the administration knew that the Taliban was unlikely
to turn over Bin Ladin.
56
The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Qaeda evolved into a new
directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled "Defeating the
Terrorist Threat to the United States." The directive would now extend to a
global war on terrorism, not just on al Qaeda. It also incorporated the Presi-
dent's determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who har-
bor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary to end
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