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propose the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life," an aim that
would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the Mid-
dle East.

Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 in the Sit-

uation Room to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted.
The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone support-
ing al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate
diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an over-
arching strategy.The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do
to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda.They concluded that if Pakistan decided
not to help the United States, it too would be at risk.

The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the

Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head
of Pakistan's military intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed.Armitage said that
the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps:

· to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support

for Bin Ladin;

· to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all

necessary military and intelligence operations;

· to provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and

other personnel to conduct operations against al Qaeda;

· to provide the United States with intelligence information;
· to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts;
· to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from

going to Afghanistan; and,

· if the evidence implicated bin Ladin and al Qaeda and the Taliban

continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban
government.

Pakistan made its decision swiftly.That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell

announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President
Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terror-
ism.The next day, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and
his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. "Pakistan will
need full US support as it proceeds with us," the embassy noted. "Musharraf
said the GOP [government of Pakistan] was making substantial concessions in
allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His stand-
ing in Pakistan was certain to suffer.To counterbalance that he needed to show
that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions."

At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pak-

istan's reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the
Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against

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