nated, just as different branches of the U.S. military are. Coordination entails a
unified command that comprehensively deploys all dispatched police, fire, and
other first responder resources.
responding to a terrorist attack but does not mandate a comprehensive and uni-
fied incident command that can deploy and monitor all first responder
resources from one overall command post. In our judgment, this falls short of
an optimal response plan, which requires clear command and control, common
training, and the trust that such training creates. The experience of the mili-
tary suggests that integrated into such a coordinated response should be a uni-
fied field intelligence unit, which should receive and combine information
from all first responders--including 911 operators. Such a field intelligence unit
could be valuable in large and complex incidents.
Evacuation Instructions.
explaining the South Tower's full collapse. Firefighters most certainly would
have benefited from that information.
of NYPD ESU instruction is attributable to a combination of (1) the strength
of the radios, (2) the relatively small numbers of individuals using them, and
(3) use of the correct channel by all.
high-rise environment. Second, tactical channel 1 was simply overwhelmed by
the number of units attempting to communicate on it at 10:00. Third, some
firefighters were on the wrong channel or simply lacked radios altogether.
channel was at least partially operational before the South Tower collapsed, we
do not know whether it continued to be operational after 9:59.
ation instruction--either via radio or directly from other first responders. Nev-
ertheless, many of these firefighters died, either because they delayed their
evacuation to assist civilians, attempted to regroup their units, lacked urgency,
or some combination of these factors. In addition, many other firefighters not
dispatched to the North Tower also died in its collapse. Some had their radios
on the wrong channel. Others were off-duty and lacked radios. In view of these