FDNY chief who knew that the South Tower had collapsed strongly expressed
the opinion that the North Tower would not collapse, because unlike the South
Tower, it had not been hit on a corner.
Tower. Some of these firefighters did not know that the South Tower had col-
lapsed, but many chose despite that knowledge to remain in an attempt to save
additional lives. According to one such firefighter, a chief who was preparing
to mount a search-and-rescue mission in the Marriott, "I would never think
of myself as a leader of men if I had headed north on West Street after [the]
South Tower collapsed." Just outside the North Tower on West Street one fire-
fighter was directing others exiting the building, telling them when no
jumpers were coming down and it was safe to run out. A senior chief had
grabbed an NYPD bullhorn and was urging firefighters exiting onto West
Street to continue running north, well away from the WTC. Three of the most
senior and respected members of the FDNY were involved in attempting to
rescue civilians and firefighters from the Marriott.
A member of the NYPD Aviation Unit radioed that the South Tower had col-
lapsed immediately after it happened, and further advised that all people in the
WTC complex and nearby areas should be evacuated. At 10:04, NYPD avia-
tion reported that the top 15 stories of the North Tower "were glowing red"
and that they might collapse. At 10:08, a helicopter pilot warned that he did
not believe the North Tower would last much longer.
missing officers. As a result, NYPD radio communications became strained on
most channels. Nevertheless, they remained effective enough for the two clos-
est NYPD mobilization points to be moved further from the WTC at 10:06.
running the command post at Church and Vesey ordered the evacuation of all
ESU units from the WTC complex.This officer, who had observed the South
Tower collapse, reported it to ESU units in the North Tower in his evacuation
instruction.
team on the 31st floor found the full collapse of the South Tower so unfath-
omable that they radioed back to the ESU officer at the command post and
asked him to repeat his communication. He reiterated his urgent message.